MALAFIDE INTENSION BASED UNITED NATION INVESTIGATION REPORT........

Report of the United Nations Commission of Inquiry into the facts and circumstances of the assassination offormer Pakistani Prime Minister Mohtarma Benazir BhuttoExecutive SummaryOn 27 December 2007, former Pakistani Prime Minister Mohtarma Benazir Bhuttowas assassinated as she left a campaign event at Liaquat Bagh, in the Pakistani city ofRawalpindi. In the attack on Ms Bhutto, 24 other people were killed and 91 injured. After a request from the Government of Pakistan and extensive consultations withPakistani officials as well as with members of the United Nations Security Council,the Secretary-General appointed a three member Commission of Inquiry to determinethe facts and circumstances of the assassination of the former prime minister. Theduty of carrying out a criminal investigation, finding the perpetrators and bringingthem to justice, remains with the competent Pakistani authorities. The Secretary-General appointed Ambassador Heraldo Muñoz, the PermanentRepresentative of Chile to the United Nations as head of the Commission as well asMr Marzuki Darusman, a former Attorney-General of Indonesia, and Mr PeterFitzGerald, a former Deputy Commissioner of the Irish Police, the Garda Siochána. The Commission commenced its activities on 1 July 2009 and provided its report tothe Secretary-General on 30 March 2010. In the course of its inquiry, the Commission received significant support from theGovernment of Pakistan and many of its citizens. The Commissioners and stafftraveled frequently to Pakistan in the furtherance of its mandate. The Commissionconducted more than 250 interviews, meeting with Pakistani officials and privatecitizens, foreign citizens with knowledge of the events in Pakistan and members ofthe United Kingdom Metropolitan Police (Scotland Yard) team that investigatedaspects of the assassination. The Commission also reviewed hundreds of documents,videos, photographs and other documentary material provided by Pakistan’s federaland provincial authorities and others. The Commission also met with representatives of other governments such asAfghanistan, the United Arab Emirates, the United Kingdom and the United States. Some relevant senior officials were not made available to the Commission, but theCommission is satisfied that this did not hinder its ability to establish the facts andcircumstances of the assassination. Pertinent information from these sources,including on threats to Ms Bhutto, nevertheless, was already in the possession ofPakistani authorities and eventually came to be known by the Commission. The Commission was mystified by the efforts of certain high-ranking Pakistanigovernment authorities to obstruct access to military and intelligence sources, asrevealed in their public declarations. The extension of the mandate until 31 March
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enabled the Commission to pursue further this matter and eventually meet with somepast and present members of the Pakistani military and intelligence services. The report addresses the political and security context of Ms Bhutto’s return toPakistan; the security arrangements made for her by the Pakistani authorities, whobore the primary responsibility to protect her, as well as her political party, thePakistan Peoples Party (PPP); events immediately before and after the assassination;and the criminal investigations and actions of the Pakistani Government and police inthe aftermath of the crime. Ms Bhutto’s return to Pakistan on 18 October 2007 and assassination on 27December 2007 culminated a year of intense political conflict, revolving largelyaround the elections scheduled for later that year and their potential for opening atransition to democracy after eight years of military rule. It was also one of the mostviolent years in Pakistani history. She returned in the context of a tenuous andinconclusive political agreement with General Pervez Musharraf, as part of a processfacilitated by the United Kingdom and the United States. Ms Bhutto’s assassination could have been prevented if adequate security measureshad been taken. The responsibility for Ms Bhutto’s security on the day of herassassination rested with the federal Government, the government of Punjab and theRawalpindi District Police. None of these entities took the necessary measures torespond to the extraordinary, fresh and urgent security risks that they knew she faced. The federal Government under General Musharraf, although fully aware of andtracking the serious threats to Ms. Bhutto, did little more than pass on those threats toher and to provincial authorities and were not proactive in neutralizing them orensuring that the security provided was commensurate to the threats. This isespecially grave given the attempt on her life in Karachi when she returned toPakistan on 18 October 2007.The PPP provided additional security for Ms. Bhutto. The Commission recognizesthe heroism of individual PPP supporters, many of whom sacrificed themselves toprotect her; however, the additional security arrangements of the PPP lackedleadership and were inadequate and poorly executed.The Rawalpindi district police’s actions and omissions in the immediate aftermath ofthe assassination of Ms Bhutto, including the hosing down of the crime scene andfailure to collect and preserve evidence, inflicted irreparable damage to theinvestigation. The investigation into Ms Bhutto’s assassination, and those who diedwith her, lacked direction, was ineffective and suffered from a lack of commitment toidentify and bring all of the perpetrators to justice. While she died when a 15 and ahalf year-old suicide bomber detonated his explosives near her vehicle, no onebelieves that this boy acted alone.
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Ms. Bhutto faced threats from a number of sources; these included Al-Qaida, theTaliban, local jihadi groups and potentially from elements in the PakistaniEstablishment. Yet the Commission found that the investigation focused on pursuinglower level operatives and placed little to no focus on investigating those further upthe hierarchy in the planning, financing and execution of the assassination. The investigation was severely hampered by intelligence agencies and othergovernment officials, which impeded an unfettered search for the truth. Moresignificantly, the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) conducted parallel investigations,gathering evidence and detaining suspects. Evidence gathered from such parallelinvestigations was selectively shared with the police. The Commission believes that the failure of the police to investigate effectively MsBhutto’s assassination was deliberate. These officials, in part fearing intelligenceagencies’ involvement, were unsure of how vigorously they ought to pursue actions,which they knew, as professionals, they should have taken. It remains the responsibility of the Pakistani authorities to carry out a serious, crediblecriminal investigation that determines who conceived, ordered and executed thisheinous crime of historic proportions, and brings those responsible to justice. Doingso would constitute a major step toward ending impunity for political crimes in thiscountry
I.
Introduction
1.On 27 December 2007, former Pakistani Prime Minister Mohtarma BenazirBhutto was assassinated as she left a campaign event at Liaquat Bagh, in the Pakistanicity of Rawalpindi. In the attack on Ms Bhutto, 24 other people were killed and 91injured.
2.In May 2008, the Government of Pakistan requested the Secretary-General ofthe United Nations to establish an international commission for the purpose ofinvestigating the assassination of Ms Bhutto. After extensive consultations withPakistani officials as well as with members of the United Nations Security Council,the Secretary-General decided to appoint a three member Commission of Inquiry todetermine the facts and circumstances of the assassination of the former primeminister. It was agreed with the Government of Pakistan that the internationalcommission should be fact-finding in nature and not be a criminal investigation. Theduty of carrying out a criminal investigation, finding the perpetrators and bringingthem to justice, remains with the competent Pakistani authorities. On the basis of thisagreement, the Secretary-General wrote to the President of the Security Council, on 2February 2009, informing of his wish to accede to the request and establish a threemember Commission of Inquiry. The President of the Security Council responded on3 February 2009 and took note with appreciation of the intention stated in the
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Secretary-General’s letter. That exchange of letters, including the agreed terms ofreference of the Commission, is attached as Annex.
3.The Secretary-General appointed in February 2009 Ambassador HeraldoMuñoz, the Permanent Representative of Chile to the United Nations as head of theCommission. Two additional Commissioners were later appointed: Mr MarzukiDarusman, a former Attorney-General of Indonesia, and Mr Peter FitzGerald, aformer Deputy Commissioner of the Irish Police, the Garda Siochána. TheCommissioners were supported by a small staff that included professionals withexpertise in criminal investigation, law and political affairs.
4.The Commission was mandated to submit its report to the Secretary-Generalwithin six months from the start of its activities. The Secretary-General was to sharethe report with the Government of Pakistan and submit it to the Security Council forinformation. The Commission was to commence its activities on a date to bedetermined by the Secretary-General and officially communicated to the Governmentof Pakistan. The Secretary-General announced the commencement of activities of theCommission of Inquiry on 1 July 2009, after a period during which the Secretariatraised voluntary funds to support the work of the Commission and built its staffingand administrative structure. In December 2009, the Secretary-General announced anextension of three months of the Commission’s mandate to 31 March.
5.The Commissioners travelled to Pakistan in July and September 2009 and inFebruary 2010 in furtherance of the inquiry. They met with and interviewed a widerange of Pakistanis, both officials and private citizens. They also conductedinterviews at locations outside Pakistan and met with representatives of othergovernments. Commission staff travelled frequently to Pakistan during the mandateperiod. Commissioners and staff conducted more than 250 interviews with Pakistanisand others both inside and outside Pakistan. Many of the persons interviewed by theCommission requested anonymity. Therefore, the report does not include a list ofthose interviewed. The Commission also reviewed hundreds of documents, videos,photographs and other documentary material provided by federal and provincialauthorities in Pakistan and others.
6.In the course of its inquiry, the Commission received significant support fromthe Government of Pakistan and many of its citizens. The Commission wishes toexpress its gratitude for this cooperation. At the United Nations, Pakistan’sPermanent Representative, Ambassador Abdullah Haroon, provided valuable supportas well. The Commission was mystified, however, by the efforts of certain high-ranking government officials to obstruct access to Pakistani military and intelligencesources, as revealed in their public declarations. The extension of the mandate until31 March enabled the Commission, among other things, to pursue further this matterand eventually meet with some past and present members of the military andintelligence agencies. The Commission also made contact with representatives ofseveral foreign governments and, in some cases, with their intelligence services. Pertinent information from these sources, including on threats to Ms Bhutto,
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nevertheless was already in the possession of Pakistani authorities and eventuallycame to be known by the Commission.
7.This report sets out the Commission’s findings on the facts and circumstance ofMs Bhutto’s assassination.
II. Facts and CircumstancesA. Political Context
8.Ms Bhutto’s assassination occurred against the backdrop of a political powerstruggle in Pakistan over the continuation of military rule under General PervezMusharraf, the President of Pakistan, or the restoration of democratically-electedcivilian government. Ms Bhutto’s return to Pakistan was a flashpoint in this struggle,the outcome of which would have significant consequences for the country’s majorpolitical actors. In addition, as will be described below, 2007 was an exceptionallyviolent year in Pakistan, which saw sharp increases in violence carried out by Islamistextremists and by the state. Political assassination and impunity in Pakistan
9.Ms Bhutto’s assassination was not the first time in Pakistan’s brief nationalhistory that a major political figure had been killed or died in an untimely fashion. The country’s first prime minister, Liaquat Ali Khan, was assassinated in 1951 in thesame park where Ms Bhutto was assassinated; the assassin was killed by police on thespot, but broader responsibilities, including who might have been behind the killinghave never been established. Ms Bhutto’s father, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, president ofPakistan from 1971-73 and prime minister from 1973-77, was deposed in a militarycoup in 1977, charged with the murder of a political opponent’s father and hanged in1979. Many believe that the judicial process against Mr Bhutto was deeply flawedand politically-motivated. Later, General Zia ul Haq, the military leader who deposedMr Bhutto and ruled Pakistan for 11 years, died in a plane crash together with theUnited States ambassador to Pakistan in 1988; investigations by the United States andPakistan into the crash came to conflicting conclusions, and it remains the object ofmuch speculation. Other killings of political figures that have never been solvedinclude the deaths of Ms Bhutto’s two brothers, Shahnawaz, who was killed in Francein 1985 and Murtaza, killed in Pakistan in 1997. The list continues to grow, morerecently with the killings, among others, of Nawab Akbar Bugti, a 79-year oldBalochi nationalist leader in a military operation in August 2006 and three otherBalochi nationalist leaders in April 2009, including Ghulam Mohammed Baloch.
10. There has been little concerted effort by law enforcement and justice sectorinstitutions to bring to justice those who planned, supported, financed or carried outthese and similar crimes. This situation has contributed to a widespread expectation
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of impunity in cases of political killings. People do not expect the perpetrators –beyond those at the lowest levels – to be identified and brought to justice.
Political and security context
11. Ms Bhutto’s return and assassination culminated a year of intense internalpolitical conflict in Pakistan. This revolved, in large measure, around the electionsscheduled for late 2007, with their potential both for opening a transition todemocracy after eight years of military rule and for engendering significant changesin the political forces that would head the new government. It was also one of themost violent years in Pakistani history, with dramatic increases both in extremistattacks carried out by radical Islamists against local targets, including suicidebombings, and in the use of force by the authorities against opposition movements. Finally, the year unfolded in a context of heightened international concerns about thestrength of the Taliban and Al-Qaida in the region and increased pressures onPakistan to take on a heavier role in the fight against them.
12. Pakistan had been under military rule since 1999, when General Musharraf,Chief of Army Staff, led a military coup that deposed an elected government. Hisregime first suspended the constitution and then modified it to provide a legalframework for the government and to strengthen presidential powers. Within thatframework, power was concentrated in the person of General Musharraf, who, afterelections in 2002, was both Chief of Army Staff and President of Pakistan. With thisdual authority, General Musharraf drew on the power of the military, while at thesame time building an alliance of political parties in the national and provincialassemblies, which ensured additional control over other important power centres. This alliance included the Pakistani Muslim League-Quaid-e-Azam (PML-Q), whichcontrolled the provincial government in Punjab, the country’s largest and wealthiestprovince, and in Sindh; the Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM) with its historicbase in Karachi; and, during most of the period, the Mutahiddah Majlis-i-Amal(MMA), which comprised the bulk of the Islamist parties. General Musharraf’sdecision to consent to the United States request for Pakistani collaboration in the waron terror after 11 September 2001 also meant that he enjoyed the firm backing of theUnited States and its western allies.
13. General Musharraf also had the full support of what is known in Pakistan as the“Establishment”, the de facto power structure that has as its permanent core themilitary high command and intelligence agencies, in particular, the powerful,military-run the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) as well as Military Intelligence (MI)and the Intelligence Bureau (IB). The capability of the Establishment to exercisepower in Pakistan is based in large part on the central role played by the Pakistanimilitary and intelligence agencies in the country’s political life, with the militaryruling the country directly for 32 of its 62 years as an independent state. GeneralMusharraf finally stepped down as Chief of Army Staff (COAS) on 28 November2007, handing the post over to his hand-picked successor, General Ashfaq ParvezKayani. This did not, however, change the military nature of the regime.
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14. The post of prime minister has been suspended five times in Pakistan due tomartial law or another form of military intervention, and no elected civilian primeminister has ever served a full five-year term in Pakistan. Most were deposed ordismissed through some form of direct or indirect military intervention. Before theelection of 2007, Ms Bhutto, as the head of the Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) hadtwice served as prime minister, from December 1988 to August 1990 and fromOctober 1993 to November 1996. Her first government ended after just 20 months,and her second lasted less than three years. Both times, she was dismissed by thesitting president, Ghulam Ishaq Khan and Farooq Leghari, respectively, based onallegations of corruption and nepotism. While both men were civilians, each hadclose ties to the military. Ms Bhutto and the PPP believed that it was the military, ormore broadly, the Establishment, that forced her out.
15. By 2007, when new parliamentary elections and the Electoral College vote forthe presidency were scheduled, there were increasing pressures for an end to directmilitary rule, both internally and internationally, including from the United Kingdomand the United States. Pakistan’s two main opposition political parties, Ms Bhutto’sPPP and the Pakistani Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N), had put aside their long-termrivalry and worked together since early 2005 to define a common framework for areturn to democratic rule. This agreement, the “Charter for Democracy”, was signedin May 2006 by Ms Bhutto and Mr Nawaz Sharif, the respective leaders of the PPPand the PML-N.
16. Tensions deepened in the country after 9 March 2007, when General Musharrafsuspended Chief Justice Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry. The Government brought anaction for his removal based on allegations of his interference in matters before thelower courts and the abuse of power to gain favours for his son and to access stateresources beyond those due his office. Nonetheless, numerous observers haveidentified two key issues at stake, both central to the political context. The firstinvolved Supreme Court actions to summon and question senior military andintelligence officials in dozens of cases of people who had disappeared in recentmonths, brought by relatives who feared they had been illegally detained by statesecurity forces. The Government maintained that the Court was undermining itsefforts to combat terrorist groups. The second issue pertained to the composition ofthe Court and its increasingly independent decisions, which took on great relevance,given its authority to determine the legality of the upcoming presidential election,which was certain to face constitutional challenges.
17. Public response against General Musharraf’s action was strong, especially fromlegal professionals, who cited the actions as a clear infringement on judicialindependence. Organized by the country’s Supreme Court Bar Association and localbar associations, they held scores of public debates, rallies and street demonstrationscalling for the reinstatement of the Chief Justice. This opposition soon became the“lawyers’ movement”, growing over the year into one of the largest mass movementsin Pakistan’s history, as it galvanized a broad range of sentiments opposed to
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continued military rule. The movement became a key factor in the political dynamicsthat year, and its activities formed a backdrop for the intensifying struggle forpolitical power
.18. Chief Justice Chaudhry was reinstated on 20 July 2007, by a 13-member panelof the Supreme Court. The dispute had not only sparked mass public protests, it alsoled to an unusually well-documented disclosure of participation by Pakistan’sintelligence agencies in political and judicial matters. Chief Justice Chaudhry’saffidavit to the Supreme Court in reference to the charges against him described howhe was called to Army House by General Musharraf and told that he was beingsuspended. General Musharraf was accompanied at the meeting by Prime MinisterShaukat Aziz, five other active duty generals and one brigadier, including theDirectors General of MI, the ISI and the IB and the President’s military Chief ofStaff. Affidavits by the Directors General of MI and the IB as well as the president’sChief of Staff were presented as part of the Government’s case against the ChiefJustice.
19. The year also saw a dramatic increase in political violence both by the state andby radical Islamists. Thousands of participants in the demonstrations called by thelawyers’ movement were beaten and jailed; its leaders were put in solitaryconfinement, and many charged with terrorism or sedition. Police raided at least twomajor television stations, some 250 journalists were arrested in the course of the yearand severe restrictions were placed on the media. At the same time, reports bycredible human rights organizations documented the disappearance of hundreds ofBalochi nationalists and the extrajudicial killings of some, whom the governmentclaimed were members of Islamist terrorist groups. Staged “encounters” in whichdetained terrorism suspects were killed by security forces, were on the rise, as well;according to the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan, 234 people were killed inpolice encounters in Punjab province alone.
20. There was a steep increase in extremist violence by radical Islamists, especiallyafter the government’s attack in July on pro-Taliban militants and their supporters atthe Red Mosque, in the heart of Islamabad, which led to a week-long battle. TheSpecial Investigations Group of the Federal Investigation Agency (FIA), whichsupports investigations in these cases, informed the Commission that 44 suicidebombings took place in 2007, killing some 614, a dramatic rise from eight suchincidents in 2006. Of these bombings, 35 occurred after the Red Mosque siege.Credible non-governmental sources put the total number of suicide bombings atcloser to 70, with more than 900 dead. The territorial reach of these actions wassignificant, with suicide bombings occurring in the North West Frontier Province,Punjab and Sindh and most major cities, including the capital, Islamabad, andRawalpindi, where Army Headquarters is located. Suicide bombings and otherattacks were often directed against police and military personnel. Other attacks werecarried out in public places, causing many civilian casualties.
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21. The government’s long-running campaigns against radical Islamist militantspunctuated by intermittent truce attempts, particularly in the Federally AdministeredTribal Areas (FATA) and the Swat region of the North West Frontier Province(NWFP), faced serious difficulties in 2007. In July, shortly after the Red Mosquesiege, militants declared an end to a ten month truce in Waziristan and launched aseries of bombing attacks that took 70 lives in just two days. The military sufferedimportant losses in the region, with at least 250 soldiers taken as hostages in Augustby the Taliban, led by Baitullah Mehsud. After negotiations between the governmentand Mr Mehsud, the hostages were exchanged in November for about 57 capturedmilitants. Earlier, in Swat, the NWFP provincial government, closely allied toGeneral Musharraf, had struck a truce in May 2007 with the Tehrik-e-Nifaz-e-ShariahMuhammadi, which eventually joined up with Baitullah Mehsud’s Tehrik-i-TalibanPakistan (TTP). The truce was seen by many analysts as giving the militants de factocontrol of Swat, but it soon broke down and fighting resumed there in September.
The negotiations for Ms Bhutto’s return
22. Ms Bhutto left Pakistan to live in Dubai in 1998, two years after she wasdeposed as prime minister in November 1996. She continued to lead the PPP duringher nine years of self-imposed exile and was deeply involvement in party affairs fromafar. During this period, she fought against the corruption charges levelled againsther in Pakistan, Spain and Switzerland, and struggled to have her husband, Asif AliZardari, released from Pakistani prison, where he faced charges both for corruptionand his alleged involvement in the murder of Murtaza Bhutto. In her final book,Reconciliation, she wrote of the difficulties of being a persona non grata for years ininternational political circles because of the charges. Her determination to return tofull political life in Pakistan led her to engage in a dialogue toward this end withGeneral Musharraf, despite her sharp criticism of his military government.
23. Serious efforts at rapprochement between Ms Bhutto and General Musharrafhad begun in 2004. Some of General Musharraf’s closest advisors told theCommission that they encouraged him to open channels with Ms Bhutto believingthat it would be better if General Musharraf had a broader base of political support forhis next presidential term and that there were sufficient common interests between thetwo to make such an alliance feasible. A discrete process was set in motion, with atleast five meetings in 2005 and 2006 between Ms Bhutto and General Musharraf’steam, which included Tarik Aziz, former Secretary of the National Security Council,General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani, then Director General of ISI and, in later meetings,Lt. General Hamid Javed, General Musharraf’s Chief of Staff. While these meetingswere important for identifying areas of common interest, they did not produce anyconcrete agreements. To break the stalemate, a direct meeting between Ms Bhuttoand General Musharraf was arranged, and the two met secretly on 24 January 2007 inAbu Dhabi. They met again on 27 July in Abu Dhabi. She and a few close advisers,which included Mr Rehman Malik and Makhdoom Amin Fahim, had ongoingcontacts with General Musharraf’s team.
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24. The discussions were facilitated by the governments of the United Kingdomand the United States, which were deeply involved in the process. Both governmentsgave priority to ensuring a continued leadership role for General Musharraf, as theybelieved this was vital for the ongoing war against terror, while at the same time theybelieved the effort could be strengthened with a credible civilian partner heading thegovernment. The United Kingdom played an early role (2004-05) in urging MsBhutto and General Musharraf to engage in discussions and in encouraging theUnited States to see Ms Bhutto as a potential partner. Later, the United States wouldplay an increasingly active role in persuading General Musharraf to agree to an“accommodation” with Ms Bhutto. Both General Musharraf and Ms Bhutto hadnumerous contacts about the process with United States State Department officials atthe highest levels throughout 2007.
25. In September 2007, after she announced the date she would return to Pakistan,Ms Bhutto began to raise her concerns and needs regarding her personal security inthese discussions, especially with her contacts in the United States Government. Representatives of the United States Government told the Commission that theyprovided advice to Ms Bhutto on hiring Pakistani private security firms used bydiplomatic missions and spoke at least once with the Musharraf camp about hersecurity arrangements. The same officials said, however, that the United States hadnot accepted any responsibility for Ms Bhutto’s security in Pakistan. Other sourcesclose to Ms Bhutto told the Commission that she had expected the United States toplay a strong role in urging General Musharraf to provide her with all of the securitysupport she needed.
26. General Musharraf informed his close political allies, including the PML-Qleadership, about the process after his January 2007 meeting with Ms Bhutto. Throughout the year, most of them continued to express their deep reservations, evenarguing against seeking PPP support for General Musharraf’s re-election as president,confident that they could win alone, sure that they would carry the day in theparliamentary elections and concerned that a broadened alliance would diminish theirpower. Similarly, few in the PPP senior leadership believed that an alliance withGeneral Musharraf would benefit the party.
27. As recounted to the Commission by interlocutors from all parties to thediscussions, Ms Bhutto laid out several issues of concern in the meetings. The mostcentral of these were: (i) her return to Pakistan to participate in politics; (ii) free andfair elections in 2007; (iii) Musharraf’s resignation from the Army; (iv) amnesty inthe criminal cases against her and her husband, Asif Ali Zardari; and (v) theelimination of the ban on third terms for former prime ministers, which would impedeher from holding that office again. The same sources indicated that GeneralMusharraf’s chief goals were to accommodate international interests in having MsBhutto return and to ensure his continuity in power.
28. Media coverage of the process led to a generalized perception that they wouldlikely govern together after the elections, with General Musharraf continuing as
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president and Ms Bhutto serving as prime minister. A number of sources interviewedby the Commission confirmed that this option had been under discussion, but that theoutcome depended on the results of the general elections. The PML-Q leadership hadalso been assured by General Musharraf that if they won the elections, their leaderChaudhry Pervaiz Elahi, would become the next prime minister. Other options, suchas Ms Bhutto becoming Senate Chairperson had also been raised. The specific termsof a power-sharing agreement between Ms Bhutto and General Musharraf were fluidand never unequivocally finalized.
29. In August and September 2007, there were intense behind the scenesdiscussions between Ms Bhutto and General Musharraf and their respective teams.Both shared an increasing sense of urgency, but had different priorities. For MsBhutto, the most pressing concern was the creation of a legal mechanism to eliminateold criminal corruption charges against her and her husband; for General Musharraf,the most immediate issue was ensuring PPP support for his re-election as president.After a meeting in Dubai, other meetings in Islamabad and many last minutediscussions, compromise agreements on both core issues were reached in the firstweek of October, less than two weeks before Ms Bhutto’s announced return.
30. Negotiations on the question of the old cases were turned over to high-levelrepresentatives of the PML-Q and PPP, who met in September at an ISI safe house inIslamabad at least twice. During these and later meetings, they drafted what wouldbecome the National Reconciliation Ordinance (NRO), which provided a virtualamnesty for political figures “found to have been falsely involved for political reasonsor through political victimization in cases” brought against them between 1986 andOctober 1999. On 5 October 2007, General Musharraf signed the NRO. On 6October, General Musharraf was re-elected president by the Electoral College,composed of the members of the sitting Parliament and Provincial Assemblies. While the PPP members abstained from the vote, they stayed in the session, whichwas required for a quorum after other opposition party members refused to participateand withdrew. This allowed the PML-Q votes in favour of General Musharraf tocarry the day.
31. According to several sources, General Musharraf was unable to convince thePML-Q to agree to support the lifting of the ban on third terms. Party leaders weredeeply opposed to the measure, as they feared it would ultimately diminish theirpower, facilitate Mr Nawaz Sharif’s return and give a boost in the elections to bothMs Bhutto and Mr Sharif. Thus, there was never any agreement to create the legalpossibility of a third term for Ms Bhutto.
32. This situation increased the importance for Ms Bhutto that the elections becarried out in a free and fair manner. She wrote extensively in her book,Reconciliation, about election rigging in previous elections, detailing her assertionsthat the ISI and MI had played the key role in these actions. In addition to this history,there were well-documented problems with the voter lists in 2007, which had to beredone at mid-year, along with thousands of complaints from PPP and PML-N
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activists that PML-Q authorities were preparing the ground for local rigging. Yet for Ms Bhutto to become prime minister, the PPP would have to win the elections with asufficient majority and build the needed alliances to ensure that, in a new NationalAssembly, they could pass legislation allowing a third term. This placed additionalpressure on her, not only to be vigilant on potential rigging, but also to carry out avigorous public campaign to win votes. Benazir Bhutto’s return to Pakistan
33. Ms Bhutto’s announcement on 14 September that she would return to Pakistanon 18 October 2007 to lead the PPP electoral campaign was made in this context. Itwas also a major point of contention with General Musharraf. He and others close tohim believed that he had a firm agreement with her that she would return only afterthe elections, then scheduled for November. Several persons interviewed who havefirst-hand knowledge of the situation told the Commission that General Musharrafwas furious when Ms Bhutto made her announcement and, according to one source,believed that her action represented “a total breach of the agreement”. Otherinformed sources said that Ms Bhutto seemed equally stunned by GeneralMusharraf’s reaction.
34. The PPP had decided in July 2007 at a meeting of its Central ExecutiveCommittee meeting in London that Ms Bhutto would continue to head the party, thather participation in the campaign was critical to raising the chances of victory andthat she would announce the date for her return in September.
35. Throughout the negotiations, General Musharraf’s principal argument forinsisting that Ms Bhutto postpone her return until after the elections was securityconcerns. He and his team emphasized the threats against her by extremist groups andthe great risks of campaigning. When Ms Bhutto announced her decision to return tocampaign, General Musharraf’s team reiterated those arguments to her, as theycontinued to do after her return.
36. While Ms Bhutto expressed to many of her closest associates her fears aboutthese and other threats, they say that she did not fully trust the warnings on threatsthat General Musharraf and his government passed on to her. According to diversesources, she had a clear understanding of the serious risks she faced. However, MsBhutto believed that General Musharraf was using the security issue as a ploy tointimidate her, to keep her out of Pakistan and to prevent her from campaigning. MsBhutto’s underlying distrust of General Musharraf and her fears that the electionswould be rigged led her to carry out a very active campaign, with much publicexposure, despite the risks she faced.
37. On 18 October 2007, Ms Bhutto returned to Pakistan from exile, flying intoKarachi from Dubai. Her husband stayed behind, a deliberate decision made onsecurity grounds. Enormous crowds met her at the airport in Karachi and along theSharea-e-Faisal highway, slowing the progress of her cavalcade to her destination at
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the mausoleum of Muhammad Ali Jinnah, the founder of Pakistan, where she hadintended to deliver a speech. Shortly after midnight, near the Karsaz neighborhood,an explosion went off near the armoured truck in which she was riding. A second,much more powerful explosion followed. Ms Bhutto was not hurt, but many otherswere, with the official toll put at 149 deaths and 402 injuries.
38. Ms Bhutto stated shortly after the attack that she was not accusing thegovernment for the attack. However, on 21 October 2007, she attempted to lodge aformal complaint in the form of a First Information Report (FIR) to supersede theKarachi police’s FIR, which she believed to be too narrow in scope. In her FIR,which was only registered long after her death, after a protracted court process, shereferred to the threat against her posed by persons she named in a 16 October 2007letter she sent to General Musharraf. While Ms Bhutto’s FIR application does notname these persons, Pakistani and foreign media soon reported that Ms Bhutto’s letterreferred to Lt.General (ret) Hamid Gul, Director General of MI under the General Ziaul-Haq dictatorship and Director General of the ISI during her first tenure as primeminister; Brigadier (ret) Ejaz Shah, Director General of the IB and former ISI official;and Mr Chaudhry Pervaiz Elahi, PML-Q Chief Minister of Punjab, one of GeneralMusharraf’s closest political allies. The Ministry of the Interior later discounted anyinvolvement by these men in the attack.
39. The Sindh police investigation of the attack never advanced. A former high-level ISI official told the Commission, however, that the ISI conducted its owninvestigation and near the end of October 2007, captured and detained four suspectsfrom a militant cell; the whereabouts of these four could not be confirmed by theCommission as of March 2010.
40. The relationship between General Musharraf and Ms Bhutto deteriorated furtherwith General Musharraf’s decision on 3 November 2007 to declare emergency rule,suspend the constitution, promulgate a series of measures that amounted to martiallaw, and again sack Chief Justice Chaudhry, together with a number of other highcourt justices. The Chief Justice and two-thirds of the country’s senior judges wereput under house arrest. General Musharraf explained the decision as necessary tocontain the rise in extremist violence. Virtually all of the sources who spoke with theCommission about this decision, including some close to General Musharraf, believethat the decisive factor was, instead, the imminence of the Supreme Court rulingregarding the legality of General Musharraf’s recent re-election as president and hiseligibility to hold dual posts as president and Chief of Army Staff. GeneralMusharraf believed that the Court was going to rule against him.
41. Led by the PPP and PML-N, political protests flared throughout the countryagainst the emergency rule measures and against military rule. Violent confrontationsbetween police and protestors occurred in a number of cities, with hundreds ofinjuries reported in the media. In November alone, the Government acknowledgedthe arrest of some 5,000 protesters; a number of PPP and PML-N candidates wereamong them. Some in the PML-Q began to call for a postponement of the elections,
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adding an additional degree of uncertainty to the situation. On 9 November, MsBhutto was briefly placed under house arrest. The next day in a speech in Islamabad,she broke with General Musharraf, denouncing his actions, calling for an end to themilitary government and announcing that any deal with him was off.
42. A number of sources close to the situation told the Commission that once backin Pakistan, Ms Bhutto increasingly understood that by contemplating plans forgoverning together with General Musharraf, she risked having to share with him thegrowing public ire against his government. She feared that her on-going politicalrelationship with him could potentially weaken her politically, diminish herlegitimacy and lessen possibilities for a solid PPP victory.
43. While Ms Bhutto reportedly later re-established contacts with GeneralMusharraf through intermediaries, she turned more of her energies toward hercampaign and to strengthening her relationship with Mr Nawaz Sharif and the PML-N. On 25 November, Mr Sharif was allowed to return to Pakistan from Saudi Arabia,following a failed attempt in September when he was detained at the airport anddeported for violating the terms of an agreement that sent him into exile for 10 yearsafter he was deposed as prime minister by General Musharraf in 1999. The PPP andthe PML-N continued to discuss strategies for the elections, and in some districtsdecided to run a single candidate. Both Ms Bhutto and Mr Sharif reconfirmed theircommitment to the Charter of Democracy and believed that there could be a strongPPP and PML-N alliance after the elections.
44. General Musharraf lifted the emergency rule measures on 16 December. MsBhutto was assassinated 11 days later. By the time of her assassination, thepossibility of rehabilitating the relationship between the two had clearly waned. TheCommission received no compelling evidence that either Ms Bhutto or GeneralMusharraf believed that she or he still needed the support of the other to achieve theirultimate political goals.
B. Security arrangements for Ms BhuttoGovernment security for Ms Bhutto
45. As Ms Bhutto’s determination to return to Pakistan on a date of her choosingbecame clear, the Musharraf government began to make security arrangements forher. These arrangements included relaying intelligence warnings of threats againsther, providing some security measures as well as deputing a police officer to act asMs Bhutto’s liaison with local authorities.
Threat warnings
46. The Commission reviewed numerous documents provided by the Ministry ofInterior as well as provincial governments that noted intelligence warnings of threatsagainst Ms Bhutto. The authenticity of these documents was confirmed through
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numerous interviews. These threat warnings were regularly communicated by theInterior Ministry or intelligence agencies such as the ISI and (MI) directly to MsBhutto, and through Mr Rehman Malik and Major (ret) Imtiaz Hussain, a policeofficer deputed as her liaison and personal protection officer.
47. The documents reveal significant threats to Ms Bhutto, particularly aroundthree time periods – from just before her return to Pakistan in October, from early tomid-November, and from mid-to late December. For instance, on 20 December, theMilitary Operations Directorate informed Interior Secretary Syed Kamal Shah thatUsama bin Laden had ordered the assassination of General Pervez Musharraf, MsBhutto and Maulana Fazal ur Rahman, a religious and political leader. Anotherwarned that an attack on Ms Bhutto and Mr Malik could be launched on 21December.
48. The Commission was told by present and former senior officials of the ISI thatthey had received intelligence regarding threats to Ms Bhutto from representatives ofthe Governments of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. In the case of theUnited Arab Emirates, their officials confirmed to the Commission that governmentto government information sharing occurred. The ISI officials stated that, on at leasttwo occasions, representatives from both countries flew to Pakistan to provide thisand other information, which generally coincided with their own. Some threatwarnings were also relayed directly to Ms Bhutto or people close to her by foreigngovernments. The Commission learned that one such instance occurred in Dubaiwhen she was urged by a high authority not to return due to the grave securitysituation in Pakistan. Ms Bhutto also mentioned in her final book that she was givenspecific information that four different groups were planning to send suicide bombersto attack her. Mr Rehman Malik informed the Commission that he receivedinformation from a “brotherly country” about another significant threat aimed at MsBhutto and himself. Mr. Malik did not specify the details of the threat. Notwithstanding the warnings received directly by Ms Bhutto or her aides, the mainconduit of information flow regarding such warnings was between the ISI and foreignintelligence agencies.
49. The Director General of the ISI, Major General Nadeem Taj, met with MsBhutto in the early morning hours of 27 December at Zardari House in Islamabad. Directly knowledgeable sources told the Commission that they spoke both about theelections and about threats to Ms Bhutto’s life; versions differ as to how much detailwas conveyed about the threats. The Commission is satisfied, that at the least, MajorGeneral Taj told Ms Bhutto that the ISI was concerned about a possible terroristattack against her and urged her to limit her public exposure and to keep a low profileat the campaign event at Liaquat National Bagh (Liaquat Bagh) later that day.
50. The Interior Ministry, as a matter of routine, passed on many of these threatwarnings, often in writing, to provincial authorities and advised them to take“foolproof” security measures. The Commission found that none of these documentscontained clear and specific instructions to protect Ms Bhutto, and the federal
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Government took no measures to ensure that its advice was followed by provincialauthorities.
51. In meetings with the Commission, the then Interior Secretary Mr Syed KamalShah minimized the federal Government’s role in her security, noting that thesecommunications from the federal Government were merely advisory since underPakistan’s federal structure, responsibility for policing and law and order are withprovincial authorities. Several senior federal and provincial officials, however,asserted to the Commission that it was rare for provincial authorities to ignore orreject a federal request. “These are taken as instructions,” was how Mr KhusroPervez, the then Home Secretary of Punjab, put it to the Commission. Similar viewswere expressed by then Inspector General (IG) of Punjab Ahmed Nasim. Moreover,when the federal and provincial governments are headed by the same political partyor alliance, as was the case in 2007, then it is even rarer for provincial authorities toignore a federal request.
52. The Commission has reviewed one Interior Ministry letter, dated 22 October2007, which is clearly a federal directive. Sent to all provincial governments, itorders them to provide stringent and specific security measures for Messrs. ShaukatAziz1and Chaudhry Shujat Hussain as ex-prime ministers. Both were from the PML-Q party and were General Musharraf’s close allies. The annex to the InteriorMinistry letter instructed provincial authorities to provide VVIP-level security for thetwo ex-prime ministers, listing the specific measures to be implemented. Despite asearch of their archives, at the request of the Commission, Punjab provincialauthorities could not find a similar directive from federal authorities in the case of MsBhutto, also an ex-prime minister. The Commission was told by the then InteriorSecretary Mr Kamal Shah that the 22 October directive was the result of aninstruction from Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz. When asked why no such directivewas issued to safeguard Ms Bhutto, he did not provide a clear answer, noting onlythat federal authorities had issued a directive on 18 October to Sindh provincialauthorities to protect Ms Bhutto when she arrived from exile. The Commission findsit inexcusable that federal authorities did not issue a similarly clear directive as the 22October directive for ex-Prime Ministers Aziz and Hussain to protect Ms Bhutto. This is all the more troubling as she had been attacked in Karachi just three days priorto the 22 October directive, and intelligence agencies had specific, on-going andcredible threats to her.Security measures
53. Mindful of the complex security situation in Pakistan and of the threats againsther, Ms Bhutto and her aides made frequent and specific requests to federal andprovincial governments to augment her security. They asked for bullet-proof vehiclesand vests, frequency jammers, permission to allow tinted windows for her vehicles,and additional trained security personnel as well as the Pakistani Rangers to protect1 Mr Aziz was prime minister when the letter was written, but was expected to step down in favour of acare-taker government. He did so on 15 November.
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her entourage and her residences. The government partially acceded to theserequests.
54. Among Ms Bhutto’s first requests was permission to be accompanied by aforeign security detail when she returned to Pakistan from exile. General Musharrafrejected the request on national sovereignty grounds.
55. Federal and provincial authorities responded positively to some of Ms Bhutto’srequests. For example, they posted policemen outside Zardari House in Islamabadand Bilawal House in Karachi and provided some police escorts when she travelled,but these escorts were generally minimal. The requests for jammers were met insome cases, but the PPP often complained that they did not work properly. Particularly in Sindh and the North West Frontier Provinces, the provincialgovernments provided some security support for Ms Bhutto in response to severalspecific requests by provincial and national PPP leaders, as well as by Ms Bhutto’ssecurity officer Major Imtiaz.
56. In November, citing security threats, the Government took two specific andcontroversial measures. Acting on the request of the Punjab Home Department, thefederal Government restricted Ms Bhutto from leaving Zardari House in Islamabadon 9 November and thwarted a planned protest at Liaquat Bagh against GeneralMusharraf’s emergency declaration. The Punjab Home Secretary also issued adetention order against her on 9 November, citing the security threats against her aswell as the vulnerability of the Liaquat Bagh venue to terror attacks. Although shewas allowed to venture outside Zardari House on 10 November, she was again putunder house arrest on orders of the Punjab Home Secretary in Lahore on 13November, preventing her from leading a Long March for Democracy from Lahore toIslamabad to protest emergency rule.
57. Ms Bhutto, the PPP and many observers believed that these drastic measureswere politically motivated. The Punjab Chief Minister at that time, Mr ChaudhryPervaiz Elahi of the PML-Q, justified the house arrests as a preventive measure forher protection, considering the specific threats against her. While security mayindeed have been a consideration, given the circumstances and timing of the housearrests, politics also played a key role. Indeed, one senior Interior Ministry officialhad no doubts that the motive for the house arrests was “political.” Even the PunjabHome Secretary who issued both the detention orders told the Commission that theywere for her protection and “administrative” reasons. 58. On 26 December, the Peshawar police made stringent security arrangements forMs Bhutto’s public meeting in that city. The Peshawar police chief Tanveer ul Haqnoted that the local PPP cooperated with him in planning the event, although it tookhim three days to convince them to shift the original venue of the public meetingfrom a vulnerable location to the more secure local stadium. Reports that the policehad arrested a potential suicide bomber at the venue were unfounded. The police didarrest a boy who was found to be carrying minute amounts of explosives without a
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detonator in his trouser pocket, the remnants from a wedding celebration he hadattended earlier that day. Mr Haq said that the boy was released after the police weresatisfied with his testimony. Official security liaison
59. Just before Ms Bhutto returned to Pakistan, the government offered her twocandidates to serve as her personal protection officer and more importantly as liaisonwith the Pakistani authorities. She chose Major (ret) Imtiaz Hussain, a SeniorSuperintendent of Police (SSP) whom she trusted as he had served with her duringher tenure as Prime Minister in 1993-96. The ISI also offered three other candidates,according to ISI Deputy Director General, Major General Nusrat Naeem, but MsBhutto turned them down.
60. Major Imtiaz was the only permanent government-provided security officer for Ms Bhutto. His main role was to be with Ms Bhutto at all times and to liaise with thelocal administration and police. He also made requests to federal and provincialauthorities for specific security support such as jammers, bullet-proof vehicles andvests and trained police personnel to escort Ms Bhutto’s entourage. Major Imtiaz didnot receive adequate support from the government to carry out his duties effectively.No support staff was assigned to him by the government; nor did it accede to many ofhis specific requests. Despite the Commission’s efforts, it could not establish whomMajor Imtiaz reported to other than Ms Bhutto while carrying out his duties, but he did coordinate with the other PPP security people surrounding Ms Bhutto.
61. Major Imtiaz also advised Ms Bhutto on her own security responsibilities. He noted that he had advised her many times not to expose herself by standing throughthe escape hatch of her armoured car to wave to the crowds, but she would usually ignore his advice and sometimes express anger at being told what to do. On the day of her assassination, Major Imtiaz did not advise Ms Bhutto not to stand up through the escape hatch.
62. The Commission finds that the federal Government did not have acomprehensive security plan to protect Ms Bhutto. It also failed to fix responsibilityfor her security in a specific federal official, entity or organization. Instead, thefederal government expected provincial authorities to provide fool-proof security forMs Bhutto, but did not issue the necessary, specific and detailed instructionscommensurate to the threats and never followed up to ensure effective measures wereundertaken. She was treated in a discriminatory manner in comparison to other ex-prime ministers. Despite the many threat warnings relayed to them, the provincialauthorities, particularly in Punjab, failed to strengthen Ms Bhutto’s security inDecember 2007.
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PPP security for Ms Bhutto
63. The PPP is a political party, not a security agency. The responsibility for MsBhutto’s security rested with the government. Nevertheless, Ms Bhutto believed thatthe government of General Musharraf could not be trusted to provide adequatesecurity for her. The PPP therefore made its own security arrangements for MsBhutto to augment whatever level of protection the government afforded to her.
64. Mr Asif Ali Zardari, Ms Bhutto’s husband, was deeply involved in planning Ms Bhutto’s security for her return to Pakistan. Ms Bhutto and Mr Zardari relied to asignificant extent on persons close to them to plan and organize the PPP’s security forher. They included former senior FIA official Mr Rehman Malik and Sindh PPP leaders Mr Zulfikar Ali Mirza and Mr Agha Sirraj Durrani.
65. Mr Malik described his role to the Commission as Ms Bhutto’s “nationalsecurity advisor”, not her physical security advisor. He also liaised with the federalauthorities on behalf of Ms Bhutto and participated as her representative innegotiations with General Musharraf and his aides. However, most PPP leadersunderstood Mr Malik’s role as encompassing all aspects of Ms Bhutto’s security. Many also said that he coordinated with Ms Bhutto’s protection detail, including withMajor Imtiaz and Mr Tauqir Kaira. The Commission finds that, in addition to whatMr Malik himself described, he performed a significant role in the overallmanagement of Ms Bhutto’s security. His letters to the authorities regarding threatwarnings and requesting specific security support reflect this involvement.
66. The PPP made specific security arrangements for Ms Bhutto in each of theprovinces, but focused particular attention on Sindh and Punjab Provinces. The initialfocus was on Sindh. The security arrangements for Ms Bhutto’s return to Karachiwere organized by Mr Mirza, a former army doctor who headed the PPP’s receptioncommittee in Karachi to welcome Ms Bhutto from exile. He was supported by MrDurrani. They were soon joined by a Major General(ret) Ahsan Ahmed, who wasappointed to head the PPP’s security committee for Ms Bhutto’s arrival. Messrs.Mirza and Durrani however, continued to function as the primary people responsiblefor Ms Bhutto’s security in Karachi. Mr Mirza oversaw the construction of a bullet-proof truck for Ms Bhutto and her entourage to use in the planned procession fromthe Karachi airport to the mausoleum of Pakistan’s founder Muhammad Ali Jinnah.
67. Messrs. Mirza and Durrani drew volunteers from the PPP’s student and youthwings and organized them into the “Jaan Nisaar Benazir” (JNB)2. The JNB’s maintask was to form a human chain around Ms Bhutto to stop suicide bombers fromreaching her, but they also performed additional security duties. According to theorganizers, the JNB numbered around 5,000 of whom about 2,000 were uniformedand formed the human chain around Ms Bhutto’s truck on 18-19 October. Mr Mirzasaid that he and some of the JNB volunteers were armed. The remaining 3,000 were2 The Urdu term Jaan Nisar Benazir means those willing to give their lives for Benazir.
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and posted at key points along the procession route to deter potential trouble. Combined with the Sindh police security cover, the PPP security arrangementsformed a formidable barrier. Despite this, two blasts hit the procession. Most of thosekilled were the JNB volunteers. In her posthumously published book, Reconciliation,Ms Bhutto credited the JNB with saving her life in the Karachi attack.
68. Messrs. Mirza and Durrani described the Karachi police cooperation as initiallylukewarm but it improved as Ms Bhutto’s arrival date neared. They also describedSindh government security deployment on 18-19 October as inadequate, but theycredited the deployed policemen with doing a commendable job. The PPP’s Sindhsecurity committee and the Karachi police worked closely on all aspects of securityfor Ms Bhutto’s return from exile, including an evacuation plan in the event of justsuch an attack. Messrs. Mirza and Durrani said the evacuation worked as planned.
69. After the Karachi attack, the PPP reviewed the security arrangements for MsBhutto. In light of the threat against her, Messrs. Mirza and Durrani decided that acore group of 250-300 JNB volunteers would always travel with Ms Bhuttothroughout Sindh. A smaller number of them were also sent on two occasions toPunjab Province as added protection for Ms Bhutto, although they did not accompanyher to Liaquat Bagh, the public park in Rawalpindi where Ms Bhutto’s held her lastpublic meeting on 27 December.
70. The PPP’s security for Ms Bhutto in Punjab was not as elaborate as in Sindh,partly due to a lack of leadership and the absence of a JNB-like corps. Even so, MsBhutto was surrounded by two groups of PPP security throughout her travels inPunjab. These groups also accompanied her to Peshawar and Jammu and Kashmir.
71. One group of PPP security comprised 14 unarmed men under the leadership ofMr Chaudhry Muhammad Aslam, who coordinated his activities with Major Imtiazand Mr Tauqir Kaira, leader of the second group. These men travelled with MsBhutto’s entourage in Islamabad, Punjab, Peshawar and Jammu and Kashmir. Theirmain task was to form a security cordon around Ms Bhutto. All were PPP partyactivists, and many told the Commission that they had been with Ms Bhutto since1986.
72. The other group of PPP security around Ms Bhutto was led by Mr Kaira, whosemen were armed. This group provided the first line of defense around Ms Bhutto. Mr Kaira also had the role of coordinating Ms Bhutto’s convoy, checking the vehiclesand ensuring their place in the convoy. He coordinated his daily tasks with MajorImtiaz and Mr Chaudhry Aslam. The Commission could not establish whom hereported to on a daily basis, especially as the campaigning picked up in December.Mr Kaira died on 27 December while trying to protect Ms Bhutto.
73. Mr Khaled Shahenshah, a PPP supporter since his student days, accompaniedMs Bhutto on her travels in Pakistan and served as her personal bodyguard. He waswith Ms Bhutto on the stage in Liaquat Bagh on 27 December and in her car when the
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fatal attack occurred. Mr Shahenshah was killed in Karachi a few months after MsBhutto’s death. Media reports at the time attributed the killing to his alleged links inthe Karachi underworld. Some people have pointed out to the Commission MrShahenshah’s strange hand gestures while on the stage in Liaquat Bagh and allegedthat he was involved in a conspiracy to assassinate Ms Bhutto. But others, includingseveral PPP leaders, dismissed such notions. The Commission did not uncover anynew facts that support the conspiracy theory surrounding Mr Shahenshah’s behaviour.
74. Ms Bhutto’s convoy included two main vehicles – an armoured white ToyotaLand Cruiser and a bullet-proof black Mercedes-Benz car – and other vehicles forsecurity staff and senior PPP leaders. She would choose one of the main vehicles fora trip, and the other would accompany as the decoy and back-up vehicle.
75. Ms Bhutto was acutely aware of the threats to her and had gone to considerablelengths to protect herself. Although the PPP had no standard operating proceduresregarding security, she devised ad hoc security drills and, according to her closestaides, frequently wore a bullet-proof vest. However, she was also determined tocampaign vigorously and openly, often interacting with crowds, thus exposing herselfto potential attackers.
76. Despite considerable and valiant efforts by individual PPP members to protectMs Bhutto, the PPP as an organization was inadequate to handle the challenges. There was no person in overall charge of the PPP’s provision of security. As a result,the PPP’s security for Ms Bhutto was characterized by a lack of direction andprofessionalism. However, the Commission reiterates that the responsibility forfailing to protect Ms Bhutto lies with the Government of Pakistan. Liaquat Bagh security arrangements on 27 December
77. A public meeting at Liaquat Bagh, an open park located in Rawalpindi, was setfor 27 December as part of Ms Bhutto’s hectic campaign schedule. Rawalpindi, a cityof some three million people, is located in the province of Punjab about 30 kilometersfrom Islamabad. The Pakistani Army is headquartered there. Liaquat Bagh isbordered by Liaquat Road to the north, Murree Road to the east, and Press Club Roadto the south. Adjacent to Liaquat Bagh, on the Liaquat Road side, an outer gate leadsto a general parking area; a second, inner gate, leads to a VIP parking area.
78. The Rawalpindi district administration and police held one formal meeting withthe local PPP committee to prepare for the public meeting. According to the minutesof the meeting made available to the Commission, it was held on 25 December andwas chaired by the District Coordinating Officer (DCO), Mr Muhammad Irfan Elahi,the highest-ranking civilian bureaucrat in the district. The PPP side was led by MrZamurrud Khan, the local PPP committee chair. A number of senior police officerswere also present. The participants discussed the Code of Conduct for the LiaquatBagh public meeting as well as issues relating to the management of the publicmeeting.
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79. The local PPP committee members said that they understood the localadministration to be responsible for all security measures for the Liaquat Bagh publicmeeting. Nevertheless, the PPP undertook to secure the stage where Ms Bhuttodelivered her last speech and stationed its workers at key entry points to the park toidentify people and assist the police in maintaining security.
80. The Rawalpindi District Police prepared a written plan dated 26 December 2007for security arrangements to cover two political meetings scheduled to take place thenext day (“Security Plan”), one of which was at Liaquat Bagh for the PPP, which MsBhutto was to attend, and the other, at Gujar Khan, organized by PML-N, which MrNawaz Sharif was to attend. The Security Plan for Ms Bhutto was more complex inthat it envisaged security for Ms Bhutto’s convoy by an Elite Force unit under thesupervision of Assistant Superintendent of Police (ASP) Ashfaq Anwar, which was toestablish a box formation around Ms Bhutto’s vehicle during movement. The policesaid that the Elite Force unit formed a box around Ms Bhutto’s vehicle at theFaizabad junction, which is the jurisdictional limit between Islamabad andRawalpindi. The Commission, however, believes that this did not occur.
81. The Security Plan listed a number of police officers responsible for varioussectors in and around Liaquat Bagh. SSP Yaseen Farooq was responsible for overallsupervision and was assisted by SP Khurram Shahzad. A command post was to beestablished at a building on the edge of Liaquat Bagh, called Rescue 15, used by localemergency services. City Police Officer (CPO) Saud Aziz – the police chief ofRawalpindi, DCO Irfan Elahi and members of intelligence agencies were present atthe command post during the meeting.
82. The Security Plan provided for two security cordons at the PPP event: an innercordon securing Liaquat Bagh and an outer cordon covering the area surroundingLiaquat Bagh, including Liaquat and Murree Roads. According to the plan 1,371police officers were to be deployed at Liaquat Bagh. Three walk-through gates withmetal detectors were placed at the public entrances to the park. The plan alsoprovided for the deployment of police constables on the rooftops of the buildingssurrounding Liaquat Bagh. According to the plan, these constables were supposed tocarry automatic rifles and binoculars. However, none of the seven constablesinterviewed by the Commission had binoculars; they were not even aware that theywere supposed to have carried them. The police were also expected to conductrandom searches of people attending the meeting. According to the police, the parkwas closed to the public by the Special Branch, who swept it for explosives andhanded it over to the police at 0700 hours on 27 December.
83. The Commission finds that the Security Plan was flawed as it placed inadequatefocus on Ms Bhutto’s protection and concentrated more on the deployment of policefor crowd control. Furthermore, it was not implemented properly. Video footage andphotographs examined by the Commission raised questions as to the number of policeofficers deployed at Liaquat Bagh. PPP officials who accompanied Ms Bhutto do not
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recall an Elite Force unit box around Ms Bhutto’s vehicle on the way to the event,only a traffic escort. These and other matters related to the Security Plan’simplementation are discussed below. C. Assassination Timeline
84. In order to ascertain the timeline of the assassination, the Commission reviewedextensive video footage and hundreds of photographs, obtained from the Governmentof Pakistan, open sources and professional photographers. It also met in London withmembers of the Metropolitan Police (Scotland Yard) team that investigated aspects ofthe assassination. The Commission closely reviewed the analysis behind ScotlandYard’s full report3and interviewed Scotland Yard officers on their methodology andforensic analysis.
85. On the evening of 26 December 2007, Ms Bhutto arrived in Islamabad by roadfrom Peshawar in the North West Frontier Province and went to her family’sresidence, Zardari House. She had a campaign event in neighbouring Rawalpindischeduled for the next day. On the morning of 27 December, Ms Bhutto left ZardariHouse for a meeting at the Serena Hotel in Islamabad with Mr Hamid Karzai, thePresident of Afghanistan. She returned to Zardari House in the early afternoon andremained there until her departure for the event. The Day of the Assassination: 27 December 2007Departure from Zardari House for Liaquat Bagh
86. Around 1400 hours, Ms Bhutto left Zardari House, for Liaquat Bagh, in aconvoy of vehicles. The convoy consisted of a black Toyota Land Cruiser used byMr Tauqir Kaira, followed by Ms Bhutto’s white armoured Land Cruiser and two ofMr Kaira’s vehicles on either side of Ms Bhutto’s vehicle. The latter two were aMercedes-Benz van on the right and a four-door double cabin vehicle on the left.Immediately behind those vehicles were two Toyota Vigo pick-up trucks, positionedside by side. A black Mercedes-Benz car was behind these Vigos. This Mercedes-Benz, from Zardari House, was bullet-proof and served as the back-up vehicle for MsBhutto. The two Vigo pick-up trucks were also from Zardari House.
87. Mr Kaira was inside the lead vehicle with his security men. Accompanying MsBhutto in her vehicle were Mr Javed-ur-Rehman (driver, front-left seat), SSP Major(ret) Imtiaz Hussain (front-right seat), Makhdoom Amin Fahim (senior PPP member,second row-left seat), Ms Bhutto (second row-centre seat), Ms Naheed Khan (seniorPPP member and political secretary of Ms Bhutto, second row-right seat). Seated inthe back of the vehicle on two benches facing each other were Senator Safdar Abbasi(senior PPP member, rear-right bench), Mr Shahenshah (rear-left bench, facing3 A team of analysts and investigators from Scotland Yard traveled to Pakistan on 4 January 2007 to “assistthe local authorities in providing clarity regarding the precise cause of Ms Bhutto’s death”. For moredetails on the Scotland Yard report, see paragraphs 188-196.
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Senator Abbasi) and Mr Razaq Mirani (personal attendant of Ms Bhutto, rear-rightbench next to Senator Abbasi and to his left). Mr Kaira’s two vehicles on either sideof Ms Bhutto’s Land Cruiser carried his men. The Vigo pick-up trucks carriedmembers of Mr Chaudry Aslam’s security team. Riding in the black Mercedes-Benzcar were the driver, PPP official Mr Faratullah Babar in the front passenger seat and,in the rear passenger seat from left to right, two PPP officials Mr Babar Awan and MrRehman Malik and General (ret) Tauqir Zia.Arrival at Liaquat Bagh
88. Ms Bhutto’s convoy reached the Faizabad junction at about 1415 hours,according to the Rawalpindi District Police, who were to assume responsibility forsecurity of the convoy. According to the police and the Security Plan, an escort wasto be provided composed of a traffic police “pilot” jeep, a regular police jeep leadingthe convoy and three Elite Force Toyota pick-up trucks protecting Ms Bhutto’s LandCruiser on three sides. People in Ms Bhutto’s vehicle claim, however, that there wasno such escort except for one traffic police vehicle.
89. At about 1456 hours, Ms Bhutto’s convoy turned right at the Murree Road –Liaquat Road junction and headed towards Liaquat Bagh. Video footage shows MsBhutto’s convoy driving from the Murree Road - Liaquat Bagh junction to the innersecurity gate leading to the VIP parking area at Liaquat Bagh. The footage shows MsBhutto standing through the roof escape hatch of her Land Cruiser and waving at thelarge crowd around the vehicle while it moved slowly on Liaquat Road.
90. Both ASP Ashfaq Anwar who was the supervisor of the Elite Force unit andInspector Azmat Ali Dogar, the unit’s commander, told the Commission that theyaccompanied Ms Bhutto all the way to the back of the stage according to the SecurityPlan. However, video footage and pictures show that as Ms Bhutto drove on much ofLiaquat Road, her vehicle was flanked only by her private security vehicles. TheElite Force vehicles were nowhere near her vehicle. In fact, the Commission hasidentified Inspector Dogar among the crowd some distance from Ms Bhutto’s vehicle. Contrary to the police assertion, there was no police-provided box formation aroundMs Bhutto as she arrived at the rally, and the Elite Force unit did not execute theirduties as specified in the security deployment. Furthermore, the Commission doesnot believe that the full escort as described by the police was ever present.
91. At about 1516 hours, Ms Bhutto’s convoy stopped for a few minutes at theinner gate of the parking area waiting for that gate to be opened, during which MsBhutto remained standing through the escape hatch. The police and some PPPmembers disagree as to the reason for the delay in opening the gate. While the PPPasserts that the police did not have the key to open the gate, the police said that theydid not want the large crowd following Ms Bhutto to get into the VIP parking area. Altogether, Ms Bhutto stood through the escape hatch for the approximately 20minutes it took to drive from the Murree Road – Liaquat Road junction to the gate ofthe parking area. This calls into question the claim of the Rawalpindi District Police
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that they were surprised when Ms Bhutto emerged from the escape hatch on her wayout of Liaquat Bagh.
92. Once the convoy passed through the inner gate, at about 1531 hours, it drovethrough the VIP parking area to the rear of the stage. At least the following threevehicles were in the VIP parking area: Ms Bhutto’s Land Cruiser, Mr Kaira’s leadvehicle and the black bullet-proof Mercedes-Benz car. Temporary wooden stairs hadbeen built for the rally to access the rear of the stage directly from the parking area. Ms Bhutto climbed the stairs, went to the stage to wave to the crowd and took her seatbefore addressing the crowd.
93. Near the rear of the stage, a scuffle broke out between some workers of the PPPand police who tried to prevent them from climbing to the stage. This created tensionbetween PPP workers and the police officers posted in that area. Accounts given byPPP representatives and the police with regard to the degree and nature of this eventdiffer significantly. The police state that the dispute was minor and was settledimmediately, whereas some on the local PPP side claim it was serious and led tobitter reactions from the police during the rest of the rally. They say that the policefelt insulted and became more passive in their security role. The Commission findsthat the police were indeed passive in their provision of security and believes itunprofessional if the Rawalpindi District Police reduced their level of alert to anydegree as a result of wounded pride. Exit from Liaquat Bagh
94. Several thousand people attended the event. Ms Bhutto was joined on the stageby a number of national-level PPP leaders and all of the parliamentary candidatesfrom Rawalpindi district. The crowds were enthusiastic, and PPP leaders andactivists considered the event to have been a great success. They say Ms Bhutto gavea strong and rousing speech, one of the best of her campaign, and describe her ashaving been radiant that day.
95. The public gathering concluded and, at about 1710 hours, Ms Bhutto descendedthe wooden stairs and entered her Land Cruiser. The occupants of the Land Cruiserand their seating positions were the same as for the trip in to Liaquat Bagh. Thecomposition of passengers in the black Mercedes-Benz car also remained the same.
96. The black bullet-proof Mercedes-Benz car was the first to leave the parkingarea. It is not clear how much distance there was between this vehicle and the rest ofMs Bhutto’s convoy at the moment of the blast. Credible reports range from 100meters to 250 meters. Some of those in the car said that they were close enough toMs Bhutto’s vehicle to feel the impact of the blast. Others at the site of the blast havesaid that the Mercedes-Benz left Liaquat Bagh so quickly that it was nowhere to beseen when the blast occurred. Indeed, the Commission has not seen this vehicle inthe many video images of the exit area it reviewed. Despite the acknowledgement ofsome occupants of the vehicle that they felt the impact of the blast, the Commission
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finds it incredible that they drove all the way to Zardari House, a drive of about 20minutes, before they became aware that Ms Bhutto had been injured in the blast. They should have stopped at a safe distance when they felt the blast so as to check onMs Bhutto’s condition, the condition of her vehicle and whether the back-up vehiclewas required. Indeed, as the back-up vehicle, the Mercedes-Benz car would havebeen an essential element of Ms Bhutto’s convoy on the return trip even if theoccupants of that car had confirmed that Ms Bhutto had been unscathed in the attack.
97. Mr Kaira’s vehicle was the next to leave the inner parking area after theMercedes-Benz car, with Ms Bhutto’s vehicle right behind it, followed by another ofMr Kaira’s vehicles. The two Vigo pick-up trucks then followed from the outerparking area located between the inner and outer gates.
98. At 1712 hours, Ms Bhutto’s Land Cruiser exited from the outer gate. Crowdsof people who were already on Liaquat Road drew closer to the vehicle as it began toturn right onto Liaquat Road. In addition, many people left the park, swelling thecrowd around the Land Cruiser, contrary to the police assertion that they did notallow anyone to leave the park before the departure of Ms Bhutto’s convoy. MsBhutto emerged through the escape hatch of the vehicle and started waving to hersupporters. When the vehicle approached the central road divider, it was slowedfurther by the crowd.
99. Major Imtiaz, who was sitting in the front seat of the Land Cruiser, said that hewas worried that the convoy was being slowed down by the crowd. He wanted to call CPO Saud Aziz by cell phone, but he did not have the CPO’s direct number. Instead he called CPO Saud Aziz’s operator and the operator at the police station in Multan,another town in Punjab Province (where Major Imtiaz had recently served). The Commission finds that this lack of preparation was a major flaw in the security arrangements and reflects badly on the professionalism of Major Imtiaz who should have had full and rapid access to the Rawalpindi police command.
100. Questions remain as to the nature of the crowd that gathered around the LandCruiser. Passengers in the Land Cruiser and some local PPP members recalled thatthey were mostly PPP workers, and they did not see any strangers or irregularmovements among them. The Rawalpindi District Police and other PPP members,however, suggested that a group of people had deliberately stood in front of the LandCruiser to prevent it from moving. Regardless of the accuracy of either account, itremains that the police did not control the crowd outside of Liaquat Bagh. As aresult, the attacker was able to get as close as he did to Ms Bhutto’s vehicle.
101. The Rawalpindi police authorities and some PPP workers dispute the exact exitroute agreed for Ms Bhutto’s convoy. The Rawalpindi District Police and DCO Elahiclaim that the planned route for the convoy was to turn right onto Liaquat Road andthen left onto Murree Road, retracing the convoy’s entry route. Only in case of anemergency was the convoy to make a left turn after exiting from the outer gate; adecision to take the emergency route had to be made by the senior police officer in
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charge of security on the scene. Some local PPP workers who attended thepreparatory meeting with the police disagree with this account. They claim that theoriginal plan was to make a left turn onto Liaquat Road and that the minutes providedby the DCO, which did not indicate this left turn, were inaccurate. In any event,photographs show two stationary police vehicles on Liaquat Road blocking the left-side drive lane where the left turn would have been made. As a result, even in anemergency, it would have been impossible for Ms Bhutto’s convoy to make a left turnand use the escape route unless those police vehicles were quickly moved. TheCommission learned that these vehicles were official vehicles of senior Rawalpindipolice officers. The Commission finds it irresponsible that these vehicles wereparked in such a way as to block the emergency exit route.
102. The Rawalpindi District Police claim that police vehicles from the Elite Forceunit headed by ASP Ashfaq Anwar were waiting outside the outer gate to escort MsBhutto’s convoy and that they were about to go into a protective box formation whenthe attack on Ms Bhutto took place. However, forming the box at this point wasimpracticable given the narrow width of Liaquat Road and the number of people whohad already started to surround Ms Bhutto’s vehicle. In any event, video footageshows very few uniformed police on the scene available to push back the crowd tocreate space for the box formation. Furthermore, video and photographs taken shortlybefore the blast as well as Commission interviews indicate that the Elite Force unitwas not in position to go into a box formation. The Elite Force unit was in placeneither for the entry nor the exit of the convoy and did not afford the protection theywere tasked with, thus failing spectacularly in their duty.
103. Overall, video and photographic materials as well as the Commission’sinterviews establish that there were very few police deployed outside the outer gateand on Liaquat Road as Ms Bhutto’s convoy attempted to depart the scene.The Attack
104. From the exit, Ms Bhutto’s Land Cruiser started to make a right turn ontoLiaquat Road. As it slowly approached the central divider on Liaquat Road, thecrowd began chanting slogans. There is some dispute over whether Ms Bhutto madethe decision to stand up on her own or was urged to do so. Before she stood up, MsBhutto asked Ms Naheed Khan to make a phone call to Mr Nawaz Sharif, PML-Nleader, to convey condolences for the deaths of some of his supporters who had beenshot during the PML-N rally earlier that day. It had been reported that the shootingincident occurred between supporters of the PML-N and those of the PML-Q parties.
105. While Ms Khan was trying to reach Mr Sharif, Ms Bhutto stopped her and asked Senator Abbasi, who was sitting in the rear seat, to chant slogans to the crowdusing the vehicle’s loudspeaker. Ms Bhutto then stood on the seat and appearedthrough the escape hatch, with her head and shoulders exposed.
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106. Ms Bhutto waved to the crowd. The vehicle continued to move slowly into itsright turn onto Liaquat Road. At this point, a man wearing dark glasses appeared inthe crowd on the left side of the Land Cruiser. Around 1714 hours, while the vehiclecontinued into its right turn, the man pulled out a pistol, and from a distance ofapproximately two to three meters, fired three shots at Ms Bhutto. According tovideo analysis conducted by Scotland Yard, the three shots were fired in less than onesecond.
107. The Commission examined video footage taken from a back angle, whichshows Ms Bhutto’s dupatta, her white head covering, and her hair flick upwards afterthe second shot. However, there is no evidence of a link between the second shot andthat movement. After the third shot, she started to move down into the vehicle.
108. After the third shot, the gunman lowered the gun, looked down and thendetonated the explosives. At the time of the blast, the gunman was near the left rear corner of the vehicle. Video footage shows that at the time of the explosion, the LandCruiser was still making the right turn. The Scotland Yard team’s analysis shows thatit took 1.6 seconds from the time of the first shot to the detonation of the bomb.
In the Land Cruiser
109. Ms Naheed Khan recalled that immediately after she had heard the threegunshots, Ms Bhutto fell down into the vehicle onto her lap. Ms Khan said that shefelt the impact of the explosion immediately thereafter. The right side of Ms Bhutto’shead came to rest on Ms Khan’s lap. Ms Khan saw that Ms Bhutto was bleedingprofusely from the right side of her head. She noticed that Ms Bhutto was notmoving and saw that blood was also trickling from her ear. Makhdoom Amin Fahimrecalled that Ms Bhutto fell heavily and showed no sign of life after falling. According to Scotland Yard’s video analysis, the flash of the blast appeared just overtwo-thirds of a second after Ms Bhutto disappeared from view.
110. No one else in her vehicle was seriously injured.
Transfer to the Hospital
111. After the explosion, Senator Abbasi told the driver to drive to the hospital(initially having in mind a hospital in Islamabad). Although all four of its tires werepunctured by the blast, the Land Cruiser managed to drive along Liaquat Road forapproximately 300 meters towards the junction with Murree Road where it turnedleft. As the Land Cruiser moved along Murree Road, it became increasingly difficultfor the driver to manoeuvre on the metal rims of the wheels. The Land Cruiser madea U-turn at the Rehmanabad junction, located approximately four kilometres from theLiaquat Road-Murree Road junction, in order to get to the other side of the roadwhere Rawalpindi General Hospital (RGH) was located. The occupants of the LandCruiser recalled that at this point there was only one traffic police vehicle ahead ofthe Land Cruiser. No other vehicles were visible – neither the bullet proof black
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Mercedes-Benz car nor any Elite Force unit vehicle. Following the U-turn, the LandCruiser stalled. The party had to wait for some time on Murree Road until a privatevehicle that belonged to Ms Sherry Rehman arrived and took Ms Bhutto to thehospital.
At Rawalpindi General Hospital
112. Ms Bhutto was received by the Accident and Emergency Department of theRawalpindi General Hospital (later renamed Benazir Bhutto Hospital) at around 1735hours. In the resuscitation room, she was treated by Dr Saeeda Yasmin. At this time,staff was busy in the resuscitation room treating victims of the shooting at the NawazSharif rally earlier that day.
113. Dr Saeeda told the Commission that Ms Bhutto was pale, unconscious and notbreathing. There was a wound to the right side of her head from which blood wastrickling and whitish matter was visible. Ms Bhutto’s clothes were soaked in blood. Dr Saeeda immediately began efforts to resuscitate her. Dr Aurangzeb Khan, thesenior registrar, subsequently joined Dr Saeeda to assist. Both doctors said that theydid not observe any other injury. As there was no improvement in Ms Bhutto’scondition, she was moved to the Emergency Operating Theatre located on the levelabove the ground floor to continue resuscitation efforts.
114. At around 1750 hours, Professor Mohammed Mussadiq Khan, the hospital’ssenior physician, arrived and took over. The doctors still had not detected a pulse. At1757 hours, Professor Mussadiq opened Ms Bhutto’s chest and carried out open heartmassage. These efforts were unsuccessful.
115. At 1816 hours, Professor Mussadiq stopped resuscitation efforts and declaredMs Bhutto dead. He ordered all the men to leave the room so that the female doctorsand nurses could clean the body. Only medical personnel had been in the operatingroom throughout this process.
116. Dr Qudsiya Anjum Qureshi cleaned Ms Bhutto’s head, neck and upper bodyand checked Ms Bhutto’s body for further injury. She saw no wounds other than theone to the right side of her head and the thoracotomy wound. Ms Bhutto was nextdressed in hospital clothing and her clothes given to her maid. The doctors stated thatthey had not seen her dupatta. The dupatta remains missing .
117. On three different occasions, Professor Mussadiq asked CPO Saud Aziz forpermission to conduct an autopsy on Ms Bhutto, and the CPO refused each request. On the second request, CPO Saud Aziz is reported to have sarcastically asked theProfessor whether an FIR had been filed,4a matter that the CPO should know, not theProfessor. DCO Elahi, who was also present outside the operating room, supportedCPO Saud Aziz’s position. The authorities however deny that the CPO deliberately4 In Pakistani police procedure, an FIR (First Information Report) is a record of the criminal complaintwhich is registered at a police station and initiates an investigation.
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refused to allow an autopsy. They insist that they wanted to get permission from MsBhutto’s family. As will be discussed below, the police’s legal duty to request anautopsy does not require permission from a family member.
118. Because he could not obtain police consent to carry out an autopsy, ProfessorMussadiq called in X-ray technician Ghafoor Jadd, who took two X-rays of MsBhutto’s skull with a portable X-ray machine. He did this without notifying orseeking the consent of CPO Saud Aziz. Though not present at the time, a radiologistexamined the X-rays the next day.
119. Ms Bhutto’s death certificate was completed and signed by the senior registrar,Dr Aurangzeb, who recorded the cause of death as “To be determined on autopsy”.
120. An ISI officer, Rawalpindi Detachment Commander Colonel Jehangir Akhtar,was present at the hospital through much of the evening. At one point, the ISI DeputyDirector General, Major General Nusrat Naeem, contacted Professor Mussadiqthrough Colonel Jehangir’s cell phone. When asked about this by the Commission,Major General Nusrat Naeem initially denied making any calls to the hospital, butthen acknowledged that he had indeed called the hospital, when pressed further. Heasserted that he had made the call, before reporting to his superiors, to hear, directlyfrom Professor Mussadiq that Ms Bhutto had died.
121. Ms Bhutto’s body remained in the operating room until it was placed in awooden coffin and removed from the hospital at about 2235 hours that evening andtransported to the nearby Chaklala Airbase. Ms Naheed Khan signed for Ms Bhutto’sbody at the hospital. At around 0100 hours on 28 December, at the Chaklala Airbase,the remains were transferred to her husband, Mr Asif Ali Zardari, who had flownfrom Dubai and who signed an acknowledgement note to that effect. Following this,Ms Bhutto’s body was flown to her home town Larkana, in Sindh Province, forburial.
The Day after the Assassination: 28 December 2007
122. On the morning of 28 December, the doctors who treated Ms Bhutto wereconvened at the hospital by DCO Elahi who requested that they submit a reportconcerning the treatment given to Ms Bhutto. DCO Elahi instructed the doctors tobring the original to him directly and further instructed that neither hard copies norelectronic copies of the report should be retained. A request for such a report hadnever been made before or after this incident. The report was prepared and submittedto DCO Elahi. On the afternoon of 28 December, Professor Mussadiq Khan gave abrief press conference on the orders of the DCO who received his instructions fromthe Home Secretary of Punjab Province. Senior Punjab officials told the Commissionthat this issue was discussed at a cabinet meeting of the government of Punjab.
123. On the evening of 28 December, a separate press conference was held by theMinistry of Interior in which the Government, through Brigadier (ret) Javed Iqbal
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Cheema, spokesperson of the Ministry of Interior, set out the cause of death as well aswho was responsible for the attack. The main points of this press conference and thecontroversy it generated are discussed below.
124. In the afternoon of 28 December, Ms Bhutto was laid to rest in her family’smausoleum at Gahri Khuda Baksh in Larkana. Her death was followed by enormousgrief and anger among her supporters. There was widespread violence throughoutPakistan over several days following her death.
D. The Criminal Investigations
125. This section discusses the criminal investigations into the assassination of MsBhutto and those who died with her. It also addresses government actions whichimpacted on the investigations, including two press conferences, the involvement ofintelligence agencies and the PPP’s interaction with the investigative agencies. The hosing down of the crime scene
126. Soon after the blast outside Liaquat Bagh on the evening of 27 December, CPOSaud Aziz left the crime scene for Rawalpindi General Hospital; SSP Yaseen Farooqfollowed shortly thereafter. The most senior Rawalpindi police official remaining atthe crime scene was SP Khurram Shahzad, who continued to take instructions fromCPO Saud Aziz by telephone. The management of the crime scene and the collectionof evidence by the Rawalpindi police during this time have generated considerablecontroversy.
127. Video footage immediately following the blast shows shock, fear and confusionamong the people at the scene and little police control. The crime scene was notimmediately cordoned off. The police did collect some evidence. Officers fromintelligence agencies, including the ISI, the IB and MI, were present and alsocollected evidence, using, as one Rawalpindi police officer noted, better evidencecollection equipment than the police. Within one hour and forty minutes of the blast,however, SP Khurram ordered the fire and rescue officials present to wash the crimescene down with fire hoses. He told the Commission that the police had collected allthe available evidence by then. Police records show that only 23 pieces of evidencewere collected, in a case where one would normally have expected thousands. Theevidence included mostly human body parts, two pistols, spent cartridges and MsBhutto’s damaged vehicle.
128. According to SP Khurram and other senior Rawalpindi police officials,including some who were not present at the scene, hosing down the crime scene was anecessary crowd control measure. They claim that some at the scene, mainly PPP supporters, were very upset when they learned that Ms Bhutto had died and that somesupporters were dipping their hands into the blood on the ground, believing it to beMs Bhutto’s, and rubbing it on themselves. SP Khurram asserted that the PPPsupporters could have become disruptive. Therefore, the police needed to wash away
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the blood from the scene as a public order measure. SP Khurram and other policeofficials also stated that there were reports of vandalism not far from the crime scene,requiring the redeployment of the police who were at the scene. Once the crimescene was hosed down, they claim, the crowd did disperse, going to RawalpindiGeneral Hospital, which permitted the police at the scene to redeploy to those othercrowd control situations.
129. Others, including police officials familiar with the case, dispute the assertionthat there was a public order problem in Rawalpindi. They further disagree that thepresence of an unruly crowd would prevent the establishment of a police cordonaround the scene of crime and justify hosing it down. No one apart from SP Khurramtold the Commission that they saw anyone smearing blood on themselves. Even SPKhurram, himself, ultimately told the Commission that he saw only one person doingthat. Sources have also pointed out that Rawalpindi was not a stronghold of the PPPand that, therefore, the police allegations were exaggerated. Sources have noted alsothat even at Rawalpindi General Hospital, where many PPP supporters were gathered,the disturbance was minimal.
130. One eye-witness said that there were about 100 to 200 people present at thecrime scene after the blast and about 20 to 30 police officers. One police officialstated that there were about 40 police officers at the scene. The Commission findsthat SP Khurram had a number of options for controlling the crowd at the crime sceneshort of the drastic measure of hosing down it down. He could have ordered thepolice officers present to form a cordon around the immediate vicinity of the crimescene; he could have redeployed any of the 1,371 police officers on duty; he couldhave called for reinforcements. He made no attempt to do any of these things. Seniorpolice officials told the Commission that SP Khurram could, indeed, have redeployedpolice officers or sought reinforcements and should have.
131. Many senior Pakistani police officials have explained to the Commission that inlaw and practice, the ranking police official at the scene of the crime takes decisionsrelating to crime scene management. SP Khurram asserted that he made the decisionto hose down the scene. Before issuing the order to the rescue and fire services, SPKhurram called his superior, CPO Saud Aziz, to seek permission, which was granted. Sources, including police officials familiar with the case, have questioned the veracityof SP Khurram’s claim that the decision was his initiative.
132. CPO Saud Aziz’s role in this decision is controversial. Many senior Pakistanipolice officials have emphasized that hosing down a crime scene is fundamentallyinconsistent with Pakistani police practice. While they acknowledge that there is nouniformity of practice in crime scene management in Pakistan, the hosing down of acrime scene is considered extraordinary. Indeed, with the exception of some Rawalpindi police officials, nearly all senior Pakistani police officials have criticizedthe manner in which this crime scene was managed. One senior police official hasargued that hosing down the crime scene amounted to “criminal negligence”. Severalsenior police officials who know CPO Saud Aziz were troubled that an officer with
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his many years of experience would allow a major crime scene to be washed away,thereby damaging his reputation.
133. Sources informed the Commission that CPO Saud Aziz did not actindependently in deciding to hose down the crime scene. One source, speaking on thebasis of anonymity, stated that CPO Saud Aziz had confided in him that he hadreceived a call from Army Headquarters instructing him to order the hosing down ofthe crime scene. Another source, also speaking on the basis of anonymity, said thatthe CPO was ordered to hose down the scene by Major General Nadeem Ijaz Ahmad,then Director General of MI. Others, including three police officials, told the Commission that CPO Saud Aziz did not act independently and that “everyoneknows” who ordered the hosing down. However, they were not willing to state on therecord what it is that “everyone knows”. This is one of the many occasions during the Commission’s inquiry when individuals, including government officials,expressed fear or hesitation to speak openly.
134. Some senior Pakistani police officials identified further factors suggesting thatCPO Saud Aziz was not acting independently. They point out that, while thedeliberate hosing down of a scene is unheard of in police practice, it has occurred ona few occasions, in each case when the military has been the target of such attacksand the crime scene was managed by the military directly. Even CPO Saud Aziz,when asserting to the Commission that there were precedents for hosing down acrime scene, acknowledged that all the incidents which he posited as precedentsactually involved a military target. The police officials who point out this pattern sawit as further indication that the military was involved in having the crime scene hoseddown.
135. Some media reports tied the hosing down of the Rawalpindi crime scene to thealleged washing of the crime scene in the October attack in Karachi. However, inKarachi, the need to put out fires in the vicinity of the blast led to the presence ofwater at the crime scene. The police collected debris from the crime scene and didnot in fact hose it down. The Karachi police actions, while flawed, led to betterpreservation of the crime scene and better evidence collection, ultimately permittinginvestigators from the FIA to recover the suicide bomber’s striker sleeve.
136. The extraordinary nature of the hosing down of the crime scene generated suchcontroversy that Punjab provincial officials recognized that some response wasnecessary. A committee of inquiry was set up by the Chief Minister of Punjab, tolook into the washing down of the crime scene. The committee was composed ofthree senior Punjab officials. The Commission requested meetings with theseindividuals, which the facilitation committee was not able to arrange. No crediblereason was provided.
137. The Punjab committee’s mandate was limited to the following:a. Inquire into the circumstances leading to the washing down of the scene;b. Determine whether it was done with any male fide intention; and,
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c. Determine whether it posed any difficulty in reaching a conclusion on thecause of death.
138. The committee started work on 14 February 2008 and concluded its work thenext day on 15 February. While acknowledging that a crime scene should inprinciple be preserved “at least till a detailed search and thorough forensicexamination” has been carried out, it accepted the Rawalpindi police explanation thatthe decision to hose down the crime scene was formed by the investigating policeofficer at the scene, SP Khurram, with permission from CPO Saud Aziz, on groundsof public order. It further found that the decision was not made with any male fideintention and that washing the crime scene did not negatively impact on theconclusion as to the cause of death.
139. Several senior Pakistani police officials told the Commission that they did notconsider the Punjab committee’s findings credible. Indeed, it is difficult for theCommission to credit the committee’s work. The terms of reference cast doubt onthat committee’s independence. The objective of crime scene management is thecollection and preservation of evidence with the overall aim of solving the crime. Bylimiting its inquiry to the narrow question of whether washing the crime sceneimpeded the reaching of a conclusion as to cause of death, the committee inexplicablyfailed to consider the impact that hosing down the scene had on the broader criminalinvestigation. It was only because of the persistent efforts of FIA investigators thatcritical evidence was found in the sewers near the blast scene.
140. The very brief time spent by the Punjab committee in the conduct of its inquiryfurther compels the Commission to question its findings. In short, the Punjabcommittee constituted a whitewash of the actions of the Rawalpindi police in failingto manage the crime scene and destroy evidence. Not surprisingly, the work of thePunjab committee was counterproductive in that it further deepened the suspicion ofmany in Pakistan over the conduct of the police on 27 December 2007.Preservation of evidence141. Even after the hosing down of the crime scene, questions continued to ariseover the preservation of evidence by the Rawalpindi police, particularly in the periodbefore investigators from the JIT started their work.
142. Ms Bhutto’s Land Cruiser was initially taken to the City Police Station byInspector Kashif Riaz some time after midnight early on 28 December and then takento Police Lines.5In the early hours of 28 December, CPO Saud Aziz went to see thePolice Lines, together with others, including ISI officers, who were the first toconduct a forensic examination of the vehicle. An investigating police officer on theorders of the CPO, removed Ms Bhutto’s shoes and took them to the City PoliceStation. Sometime thereafter, the shoes were ordered back into the car. This was5 Police Lines is an administrative centre for Rawalpindi District Police that includes barracks and otherfacilities.
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clearly interfering with the integrity of the evidence. Furthermore, while the vehiclewas parked at Police Lines, it was not properly preserved. The Commission was toldthat during a visit by some JIT members, people were seen in the vehicle cleaning iteven though investigations were still on-going. When the JIT carried out its physicalexamination of the vehicle, they did not find any hair, blood or other matter on the lipof the escape hatch. Forensic analysis of swabs of the lip of the escape hatch latercarried out by the JIT and Scotland Yard also found nothing. It is impossible toestablish whether the interference with the vehicle resulted in the elimination of anymatter that may have been present on the lip, or whether there was no such matter inthe first place. It is clear, however, that such interference would have damaged anyforensic evidence present.On the decision not to carry out a post-mortem examination
143. The Commission was told that CPO Saud Aziz on three occasions refused therequest of the doctors for permission to carry out a post-mortem examination on MsBhutto’s remains. Pakistani law provides that in the case an unnatural death, thepolice must have a post-mortem examination report as part of their investigations.This requirement places the responsibility for initiating the examination on the policeand not the hospital authorities. Indeed, hospital authorities must get a request fromthe police before proceeding. Numerous people interviewed, including all doctorsand nearly all senior police officers, have reiterated this rule. Even CPO Saud Azizhimself acknowledged that this is the law in Pakistan.6Only a District Magistratemay waive the need for a post-mortem examination. If the family of a deceasedperson does not wish to have a post-mortem examination carried out, it must apply toa judge for an order waiving the requirement.
144. Some people have suggested to the Commission that the practice is differentfrom the legal requirement. Due primarily to religious considerations, permissionfrom the family might be sought. There are sensitivities around conducting a post-mortem examination of a woman in Pakistani culture. However, due to the forensicimportance of the examination, the police might take steps to overcome any religiousor cultural objections. One senior police officer explained that, in his experience,when family members have been reluctant to have a post-mortem examination, thepolice have taken time to convince them to change their position because the post-mortem examination is so central to the conduct of any investigations
145. While denying that the doctors requested his authority for a post-mortem threetimes, CPO Saud Aziz told the Commission that because of the importance of theperson of Ms Bhutto, he could not just have a post-mortem examination without firstseeking her family’s consent. He first sought the approval of the President of thePPP, Makhdoom Amin Fahim for a post-mortem examination. Mr Fahim told him6 Doctors have noted that autopsies were not normally conducted at RGH, but rather at DistrictHeadquarters Hospital also in Rawalpindi. Had the police requested one or acceded to the doctors’ plea tohave one, Ms. Bhutto could have been moved to a different hospital for the post-mortem examination, or apathologist from another hospital could have gone to RGH.--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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that he was not in a position to give such approval and asked him to wait for Mr Zardari who was on his way to Pakistan from Dubai. When Mr Zardari arrived at Chaklala Airbase, the request for permission was made to him and he declined.
146. The Commission does not find that there are credible reasons for failing to carryout an autopsy on Ms Bhutto’s. The body had already undergone invasive medicalprocedures when the open heart massage was undertaken. Moreover, a post-mortemexamination limited to a complete external examination and not involving anyinvasive surgery could have been carried out. Even that limited exam was notconducted in this case. While one doctor did take a general look over the body, thedoctors admit that this did not constitute a proper external post-mortem examination.
147. It is odd that Ms Bhutto’s remains were moved to the Pakistan Air Force base(Chaklala Airbase) in Rawalpindi before Mr Zardari’s arrival from Dubai. Accordingto sources, the body was taken from the hospital around 2300 hours, on 27 December. The note signed by Mr Zardari accepting his wife’s remains is timed 0110 hours on28 December. If the police were genuinely waiting for Mr Zardari’s permissionbefore requesting a post-mortem examination, they should have left Ms Bhutto’sremains at the hospital. Instead they moved her remains to Chaklala Airbase, therebyrendering such an examination more difficult. When questioned about this, seniorPunjab officials stated that the plan was to carry out the examination at the basewhich also had medical facilities. However, the fact that Ms Bhutto’s coffin was nottaken to the medical facilities, but placed in a room at the base makes this assertiondoubtful.
148. There was a series of memos from CPO Saud Aziz and his superiors regardingthe absence of a post-mortem examination. The CPO wrote a memo to his immediatesuperior, the IGP of Punjab, dated 27 December, but actually written in the morningof 28 December, in which he reported that an autopsy could not be conducted becauseher husband had refused to authorize one. The IGP then sent a memo, also dated 27December (and written on 28 December), to the Home Secretary of Sindh Province reporting Mr Zardari’s refusal and suggesting that the matter be taken up by the Home Department of Sindh Province. On 28 December, a letter was written from the Punjab Additional Secretary, Internal Security, to the Sindh Home Secretary,requesting that the latter seek Mr Zardari’s permission to conduct a post-mortemexamination on Ms Bhutto’s remains prio r to burial.
149. The Commission finds the letter written by CPO Saud Aziz to be fundamentally misleading. Nothing in the letter explains why the autopsy had not been carried outearlier, during the preceding five hours while Ms Bhutto’s remains were at RGH. Rather, the letter focuses solely on Mr Zardari’s refusal to approve an autopsy – andportrays even that refusal in misleading terms. The letter is clearly intended to hideCPO Saud Aziz’s fundamental failure to carry out his legal obligation regarding theautopsy and, instead, to redirect blame for this failure to Mr Zardari. The effort to pinresponsibility for this failure on Mr Zardari is unacceptable. No autopsy had beencarried out even though five hours had passed since Ms Bhutto had been declared
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dead. The body had been placed in a coffin and brought to the PAF airbase. CPOSaud Aziz placed Mr Zardari in an impossible situation – one which almostcompelled Mr Zardari to refuse the request for an autopsy.
150. The subsequent letter by the IGP, Punjab reiterating the misleading summary ofevents set out in CPO Saud Aziz’s letter reflects the willingness of his administrativesuperior to further this shift of responsibility and perpetrate a cover-up of the truereason behind the lack of a post-mortem examination.
151. In short, CPO Saud Aziz did not fulfil his legal obligation to order an autopsy. Having failed in that regard, he sought to cover up his failing by putting Mr Zardari ina situation designed to elicit his refusal of an autopsy. CPO Saud Aziz’s further effortto cover his failings by writing a memo pinning blame on Mr Zardari was highlyimproper. On their face, these factors taken together strongly suggest a preconceivedeffort to prevent a thorough examination of Ms Bhutto’s remains.
152. CPO Saud Aziz, an experienced senior police officer, refused to allow a post-mortem examination. He certainly knew the requirements of the law and the practiceof law enforcement in such cases. He need not have waited for Mr Zardari. He was,furthermore, aware of the importance and status of the person involved. All thesefactors together support the view held by many Pakistanis that CPO Saud Aziz didnot act independently in this matter. CPO Saud Aziz’s insistence on justifying hisactions has made it difficult for the Commission to inquire any further and attempt tounearth who might have been behind the decision.
On whether Ms Bhutto was shot
153. Although a number of PPP members asserted publicly and in private shortlyafter the assassination that Ms Bhutto had been shot, none of the many PPP members,both senior and low-ranking, interviewed by the Commission could confirm thatassertion. Some PPP members told the Commission that at least one of the doctorshad initially stated that Ms Bhutto had suffered gunshot injuries, implying that thedoctors must have deliberately altered their findings subsequently. The Commissionwas unable to find any basis to support this view, however honestly held. Rather,some doctors do indeed acknowledge that they openly discussed the possibility ofgunshot injuries early in their efforts to resuscitate Ms Bhutto, but excluded thatpossibility in their final assessment. There is one doctor who arrived during theevening at Rawalpindi General Hospital who continues to assert that there was agunshot wound. He was not, however, an examining doctor and does not base hisviews on direct observation of a gunshot injury.
154. The Commission also interviewed some PPP supporters who had been injuredin the blast. None had received any bullet wounds, as previously reported in somemedia reports. According to the police, over 25 people were also interviewed in theimmediate aftermath of the incident, and none received bullet wounds. They wereinjured by ball bearings, but not bullets.
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155. The Commission has not been provided with any credible, new informationshowing that Ms Bhutto had received bullet wounds. A senior PPP official, who hadearlier publicly asserted that she had seen Ms Bhutto’s gunshot injuries, retracted thatstatement when interviewed by the Commission. In fact, she had not seen MsBhutto’s head wound and had been told to tell the media that she had seen bulletwounds. The Commission found that, although her supporters may have justifiablyassumed that Ms Bhutto had been shot in the confusion surrounding the assassination,the continued assertion that she had been shot, without evidence, as well as theassertion of untrue eyewitness accounts, was and remains misleading. TheCommission recognizes that the confusion and urgency at Rawalpindi GeneralHospital when Ms Bhutto was brought there would naturally have generated somediscussion among the staff there about the possibility of a gunshot wound. Suchdiscussions may have been misinterpreted by some as a medical finding
The Government Press Conference:
156. At about 1700 hours on the day following the assassination the governmentheld a televised press conference, conducted by Brigadier Cheema, the spokespersonof the Ministry of Interior at which he announced that:a. Ms Bhutto died from a head injury sustained when from the force of theblast she hit her head on the lever of the escape hatch; and, b. Mr Baitullah Mehsud linked with Al-Qaida was responsible, presenting anintercepted telephone conversation between Mr Mehsud and one MrMaulvi Sahib in which Mr Mehsud was heard congratulating Mr Maulvion a job well-done.
157. The decision to hold the press conference was made by General Musharraf,during a meeting on the morning of 28 December at a facility in GeneralHeadquarters known as Camp House. That meeting, at which General Musharraf wasbriefed on the intercept and on medical evidence, was attended by the DirectorsGeneral of the ISI, MI and the IB. Brigadier Cheema was summoned to a subsequentmeeting at ISI Headquarters and directed by the Director General of the ISI to holdthe press conference. In attendance at this second meeting, in addition to BrigadierCheema, were Interior Secretary Kamal Shah, Director General of the ISI, DirectorGeneral of the IB, Deputy Director General of the ISI and another ISI brigadier.
158. The Musharraf government asserted that the evidence for the cause of deathwas clear. According to the government, video footage showed that the shooter’sbullets did not hit Ms Bhutto. Based on the medical report indicating that she died ofheavy bleeding from a head wound on the right side of her head, the Musharrafgovernment set out its conclusion, through Brigadier Cheema, that she must have hither head on the lever of the vehicle’s escape hatch.
159. The press conference was met with widespread public scepticism and mediaoutrage in Pakistan. The PPP and others accused the government of a cover up.
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Many questioned the sudden and timely appearance of the telephone intercept as wellas the speed with which its contents were analyzed and interpreted. Many alsochallenged the view that Ms Bhutto had not been shot and questioned how quicklythat purported analysis had been done. Furthermore, many senior PPP officialsbelieved the government was suggesting, in an effort to demean Ms Bhutto, that shehad caused her own death by emerging from her vehicle. In short, the pressconference not only failed to provide credible answers to essential questions arisingfrom the assassination, it triggered widespread suspicion that government authoritieswould not be conducting a genuine search for the truth.
The First Joint Investigation Team (Punjab-led)
160. On 28 December, Punjab authorities set up a Joint Investigation Team (JIT) forthe assassination. The JIT declared its work finished on 17 February 2008. Thissection will provide an overview of the constitution, internal dynamics and focus ofthe first JIT established shortly after Ms Bhutto’s assassination. It does not seek toset out in detail the JIT’s findings.
161. Under the Anti-Terrorism Act, when a terrorist offence has been committed, theestablishment of a JIT is mandatory. The relevant provision is broad, defining a JITas an investigation involving one law enforcement agency working together withother agencies, either law enforcement or intelligence. With other types of crimes, itis usually the provincial police that has primacy in the investigation of a crime, andfor the Federal Capital Territory of Islamabad, the Federal Government takes the lead.But in terrorism cases, either the provincial police or the Federal Government caninitiate a JIT. When initiated by a province, the provincial government takes the leadin selecting the team members. Due to the expertise of the Special InvestigationsGroup (SIG) of the Federal Investigation Authority (FIA), the FIA generally assignssome of its officers from that section to the JIT.7When a JIT is set up by a province,a notification is sent to the FIA inviting the assignment of SIG staff to the team.
162. The JIT was headed by Mr Abdul Majeed, Additional IG (AIG) for Punjab. Inaddition to police officials from Punjab, the JIT included three senior members of theFIA, including an explosives expert, a senior CID police officer at the rank of DIG,an expert on forensic photography and nine middle ranking police officers. At thetime the JIT was established, AIG Majeed was out of the country and, for the first twodays, the JIT was headed by the next most senior police officer on the team, theDIG/CID in Lahore, Mushtaq Ahmad Sukhera. DIG Sukhera and his team startedwork on 28 December 2007.
163. On the evening of 28 December, members of the JIT went to Police Lineswhere they met CPO Saud Aziz. Rather than proceeding directly to the crime site,7 The FIA was established under The FIA Act 1975. It has powers to investigate all offences that are setout in the Schedule to the Act, including terrorism. Expertise in the investigation of terrorism cases restswith the Special Investigation Group (SIG) within the FIA. The SIG was established after 11 September2001 and became operational in April 2003.
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CPO Saud Aziz laid out tea for the JIT investigators in a conference room. While theJIT members were still in the conference room, the television aired the pressconference given by Brigadier Cheema. According to a credible source, at the end ofthe press conference, the CPO rhetorically asked the JIT members what they intendedto investigate, since the perpetrator had been identified. When the JIT memberspressed to visit the crime scene, CPO Saud Aziz, noting that it was already dark,stated instead that he would arrange for a visit to the scene in the morning. Thesource noted above interpreted these actions as a means of hindering the JITinvestigators’ access to the crime site.
164. On 29 December, the following day, the JIT investigators returned to PoliceLines where they were able to inspect Ms Bhutto’s vehicle. They discovered early intheir inspection that there was no blood or tissue on the escape hatch lever that wouldbe consistent with the gaping injury to Ms Bhutto’s head, suggesting strongly to theinvestigators that Ms Bhutto had not hit her head on the lever.
165. Following that inspection, rather than taking the investigators directly to thecrime scene, CPO Saud Aziz hosted a lunch that went into the late afternoon, at theend of which he again, according to the same source cited above, indicated that itwould be dark by the time the team arrived at the crime scene. It was only at around1700 hours that the JIT investigators were taken to the crime scene at Liaquat Bagh. The Commission finds it inexplicable that the investigators were not in a position toconduct on-site investigations until two full days after the assassination. Suchconduct further hampered the gathering of evidence and, at the very least, wascontrary to best practices.
166. Once at the scene, the investigators could see that it had been hosed down. Despite the late hour, they spent seven hours there. They followed the water current,including wading through the drainage sewer and collected evidence from the debris. They were able to recover one bullet casing from the drainage sewer, later establishedthrough forensic examination to have been fired from the pistol bearing the bomber’sDNA. The JIT members left the scene around midnight. The Rawalpindi policeprovided security for them, and the road was cordoned off during the entire time. Thenext day, the team returned to continue the search. Upon their request, the sceneremained cordoned off and the road closed. They eventually recovered otherevidence in the course of their crime scene examination, including the partial skull ofthe suicide bomber from atop one of the buildings near the site.
167. On 31 December, AIG Majeed returned from his trip and took over theleadership of the JIT. This change at the JIT’s helm resulted in a shift in the internaldynamics of the investigation. Mr Majeed effectively sidelined the senior and moreexperienced officers who had started the investigations and dealt directly with themost junior investigators of the JIT. Two senior officers invited into the JIT from theSindh police decided to return to Sindh after only two days with the JIT. Much of thework carried out by the JIT from this point was led by information Mr Majeed
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received from the intelligence agencies, which retained sole control over the sharingof information with the police, providing it on a selective basis.
168. The scientific analysis of the suicide bomber’s remains by the Scotland Yardteam established that he was a teenage male, no more than 16 years old. According tothe JIT’s investigations, this young man was named Bilal also known as Saeed fromSouth Waziristan. This was established through the links that the accused personsadmitted having had with the bomber and the ISI telephone intercept of BaitullahMehsud’s conversation with Maulvi Sahib.
The accused persons
169. Five persons were arrested by the JIT: Aitezaz Shah, Sher Zehman, HusnainGul, Mohamad Rafaqat and Rasheed Ahmed. In addition, the JIT charged Nasrullah,Abdullah, Baitullah Mehsud and Maulvi Sahib as “proclaimed offenders”. BaitullahMehsud was killed in a drone attack in August 2009, and Nasrullah is reported tohave been killed in an attack in FATA.
170. The Commission will not address in any detail the case against theseindividuals. It notes generally, however, that the accused are alleged to have servedas handlers and logistics supporters of the suicide bomber, or as persons who wereknowledgeable about the plans to assassinate Ms Bhutto but failed to provide suchinformation to the police. The charges against them include aiding and abettingterrorism, murder and concealing information about the commission of a crime.
171. The JIT focused its efforts on investigating the alleged role of these low-levelindividuals. Little to no focus was placed on investigating those further up thehierarchy in the planning and execution of the assassination. In particular, the JIT didnothing to build a case against Mr Mehsud, treating the contents of the interceptpresented to the public by Brigadier Cheema as determinative of his culpability. AIGMajeed told the Commission that he saw no need to establish the authenticity of theintercept or the basis for its analysis, including the voice identification and theinterpretation of the conversation as a reference to the Ms Bhutto’s assassination. The Commission finds this approach to the investigation contrary to best practicesand inconsistent with a genuine search for the truth.
172. The Commission notes also with some concern the discrepancy in the detentionrecord of some of the accused persons, particularly in light of the well-knowncontroversy over extra-judicial detention by intelligence agencies prior to their arrestby law enforcement agencies.
Baitullah Mehsud
173. The then-government’s assertion that Baitullah Mehsud was behind theassassination of Ms Bhutto was premature at best. Such a hasty announcement of theperpetrator prejudiced the police investigations which had not yet begun. Other flaws
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42in the JIT’s approach to investigating Baitullah Mehsud’s alleged role in theassassination are also inconsistent with a genuine search for the truth.
174. The communication intercepted by the ISI is purported to be a telephoneconversation between Emir Sahib (said to be Baitullah Mehsud) and Maulvi Sahib. In it, the two speakers congratulate each other on an event which Brigadier Cheemaasserted was the assassination. The ISI asserts that they already had the voicesignature of Baitullah Mehsud and were in a position to identify his voice on theintercept. In the English translation of transcript of the intercept, Emir Sahib at somepoint asked Maulvi Sahib: “who were they?” Maulvi Sahib replied: “There wereSaeed, the second was Badarwala Bilal and Ikramullah was also there.” Mehsudasked: “The three did it?” Maulvi Sahib replied: “Ikramullah and Bilal did it”. Theconversation did not mention Ms Bhutto by name. The Commission is not in aposition to evaluate the authenticity of the purported intercept. Any furtherinvestigation into Ms Bhutto’s assassination must include steps for suchauthentication.
175. It is not clear how or when the intercept from the ISI was recorded. A formersenior ISI official told the Commission that the ISI had been tracking BaitullahMehsud’s communications closely and was, therefore in a position to identify hisvoice. Furthermore, he asserted that the ISI had been tracking Taliban-linked terroristcells that were closely pursuing Ms Bhutto, targeting her at a series of successivepublic gatherings. According to this ISI official, it was one of these cells whichfinally assassinated Ms Bhutto in Rawalpindi.
176. The ISI was highly confident of the accuracy of its investigations, much ofwhich were based on the analysis of intercepts, through which it was possible toidentify each cell and also the link of each of these cells to Baitullah Mehsud. On thebasis of its investigations, the ISI detained four persons for involvement in theKarachi bombings within two weeks of that attack. According to the former ISIofficial cited above, interrogations confirmed their intercepts analysis. TheCommission is not in a position to assess the credibility of this information from theISI. However, this information does raise important questions, which are addressedfurther below.
177. There are media reports that Mr Mehsud denied responsibility for theassassination. Mr Saleh Shah Qureshi, Senator from South Waziristan, told theCommission that Mr Mehsud had categorically denied any involvement in theassassination attempt of 18-19 October and the subsequent assassination of MsBhutto on 27 December, questioning also the authenticity of the telephone interceptascribed to Mr Mehsud. The JIT took no steps to investigate the veracity of any suchdenial. Rather, some government officials from that time told the Commission thatany such denials would have no credibility, implying that such investigative stepswould not be worthwhile.
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178. After the arrest of the five accused persons, the JIT essentially ceasedinvestigating the possibility of other perpetrators, particularly those who may havebeen involved in planning or directing the assassination by funding or otherwiseenabling the assassination. The JIT even ended its efforts to identify the suicidebomber. Persons accused by Ms Bhutto in a letter dated 16 October 2007179. On 16 October 2007, Ms Bhutto writing from Dubai to General Musharraf,identified three people she considered a threat to her security: (i) Brigadier (ret) EjazShah, Director General of the IB at the time of the assassination, (ii) General (ret)Hamid Gul, a former Director General of the ISI, and (iii) Mr Chaudhry PervaizElahi, Chief Minister of Punjab until 22 November 2007.
180. The Ministry of Interior responded to Ms Bhutto in a letter dated 6 November2007, stating that the threats she related had “neither tangible basis nor is there anyevidence to support the perception” contained therein. The Commission spoke withtwo of those named in the letter and others close to them, all of whom hold the viewthat the letter was baseless and politically motivated. With respect to Ms Bhutto’sclose aides, none of those who met with the Commission affirmed having seen theletter before it was written, and they had varying interpretations of its contents andintentions. One believed that the letter was intended to put political pressure onGeneral Musharraf by naming two people closely associated with him and puttinghim on notice of her concerns. Other sources, including a former high-rankingforeign official, thought the men posed genuine threats to her security, linking themto the Establishment and its long-standing enmity towards the PPP and the Bhuttofamily. The Commission received no information of specific threats that they mayhave directed against Ms Bhutto.
181. In the course of their investigations, neither the Karachi nor the JITinvestigators interrogated or interviewed any of these people. Karachi and JITinvestigators explained that they could not summon and interrogate them on the basisof Ms Bhutto’s accusations, without more information. Ms Bhutto made indirectreference to these individuals in the FIR she filed in Karachi after the attack on 18-19October. However, while the FIR referred to the 16 October letter, it did not providethe names, nor was a copy attached. Nor did any PPP member provide the names tothe investigators. These factors were raised by Karachi and JIT investigators inexplaining to the Commission why they declined to approach these three men.
182. While recognizing that Ms Bhutto and other PPP members were notforthcoming with the police on this issue, the Commission believes that policeinvestigators should nonetheless have invited the three individuals to meet with them,on a voluntary basis. The names of the three individuals had been widely circulatedin the press, as Karachi and JIT investigators acknowledged.
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PPP interaction with the investigations
183.
The relationship between the PPP and the Pakistani police was characterisedby mistrust on the part of the PPP. This was evident in their lack of co-operation withthe Karachi police following the attack of 18-19 October 2007, and their lukewarmattitude towards the Rawalpindi investigations.
184. Apart from Major Imtiaz, the JIT never interviewed the people in the car withMs Bhutto at the time of the incident. When asked about this, AIG Majeed explainedthat those persons had been summoned to be interviewed, but they refused to appear. However, some members of the JIT acknowledged that, while they could confirm thatthe letters summoning PPP members for interviews had been sent, they did not haveany confirmation that they had been received. In general, the limited efforts of theJIT to reach out to the PPP are highlighted by a comparison to the efforts of theKarachi police after the October attack. There, although relations between theKarachi police and the PPP were tense, bordering on antagonistic, the Karachi policemade efforts to accommodate PPP concerns by, among others things, replacing theinitial lead investigator at the PPP’s request.
185. PPP members deny that the police contacted them, asserting that they wouldhave appeared if contacted. To underscore that willingness, they point out that whencontacted by Scotland Yard they did, in fact, respond. In addition, they point out thatthey had spoken to several media outlets about the assassination and related events. They maintained that having been so close to Ms Bhutto, it was only natural that theywould want the truth regarding her death to come out.
186. At the same time, several PPP members explained to the Commission that thePPP did not have faith in the integrity of the investigations and that, as a result, theydid not cooperate with the police. Some senior PPP members acknowledged to theCommission that the PPP had, accordingly, adopted a policy against cooperating withthe Karachi police investigation because the police had refused to register their FIR. This distrust of the police by the PPP was reflected also in Ms Bhutto’s efforts tolodge a second FIR following the Karachi attack.
187. The Commission recognizes that the PPP distrust of the police investigations inboth Karachi and Rawalpindi contributed to the party’s unwillingness to cooperatewith the criminal investigations. However, the PPP’s refusal to cooperate with theKarachi and Rawalpindi investigations was not constructive. The Commission notesthat PPP members clearly did not have to wait to be formally notified to talk to thepolice. As in any law enforcement matter, PPP members were free to take theinitiative to speak to investigators. Scotland Yard
188. Following discussions between the United Kingdom Prime Minister GordonBrown and General Musharraf, it was agreed that a team of forensics experts and
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investigators from the Metropolitan Police’s Counter Terrorism Command (SO15)would carry out a limited investigation to assist the Pakistani police investigation intoMs Bhutto’s assassination. The team’s work resulted in a confidential report.
189. The terms of reference for Scotland Yard’s assistance, agreed between the UK’sForeign and Commonwealth Office and the Interior Ministry of Pakistan, were madepublic through a statement issued on 11 January 2008 by the British HighCommission in Pakistan. The main objective of the Scotland Yard team was “toassist the local authorities in providing clarity regarding the precise cause of MsBhutto’s death”. According to the Scotland Yard report, a team of experts andinvestigators arrived in Pakistan on 4 January 2008 and spent two and a half weekscarrying out their investigation. The British High Commission in Pakistan releasedan executive summary of the Scotland Yard report on 8 February 2008. The mainbody of the report has not yet been made public.
190. According to the summary, the team’s key findings included the following:a. although not possible to “categorically…exclude” the possibility of agunshot wound, the available evidence suggested there was no gunshotwound; b. Ms Bhutto died of a severe head injury caused by impact in the area of theescape hatch lip as a result of the blast; and c. the same individual both fired the shots and detonated the explosives.The summary notes that the “task of establishing exactly what happened wascomplicated by the lack of an extended and detailed search of the crime scene, theabsence of an autopsy….” However, it goes on to assert that “[n]evertheless, theevidence that is available is sufficient for reliable conclusions to be drawn.” Thislatter comment has been seized upon by some Pakistani officials as support for theperformance of the Rawalpindi District Police in the crime scene management and assupport for their failure to allow the autopsy. It is unfortunate that the poorperformance of the Rawalpindi police was excused in the executive summary.
191. Since only the executive summary is public, critical elements of the ScotlandYard report are not widely known. In the Commission’s view, it is important to notethat, in the Scotland Yard team’s view, there was no forensic examination of thecrime scene by the police on 27 December 2007.8The team found chaos andconfusion understandable in the “immediate aftermath” of the blast and during theevacuation of casualties, but noted that there was never any organized or structuredscene control or forensic examination that evening. For what evidence was collected,the Rawalpindi police often did not note their original location accurately. TheScotland Yard team was told by one police officer that the scene was searched for 45minutes. Scotland Yard found that the scene was hosed down “within an hour” afterthe blast and, as a result, the “opportunity for a thorough forensic examination waslost”. 8 The Scotland Yard team makes no reference to the collection of evidence by intelligence agencies.
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192. Dr Nathaniel Cary, the pathologist appointed by Scotland Yard, confirmed that the force of the blast caused Ms Bhutto’s fatal injury. However, Ms Bhutto did notsuffer her injuries from hitting the latch of the escape hatch, as announced in theMinistry of Interior’s press conference on 28 December 2007. Rather, Dr Caryasserted that her head struck somewhere on the lip of the escape hatch opening. While Scotland Yard’s finding was arrived at after investigation, the Ministry ofInterior’s was conclusory.
193. As noted above, officials at the time sought also to invoke the Scotland Yardreport to excuse the failure to conduct an autopsy. The report does not offer anysupport for that failure. Rather, the report cites Pakistan’s Criminal Code of 1898 (asamended by Act II 1997, section 174(3) which mandates that a police officer shallsubmit a body for an autopsy and notes that Dr Aurangzeb had written that the causeof death was “[t]o be ascertained by autopsy.” The team’s executive summary notedthat “[t]he task of establishing exactly what happened was complicated by [amongother things] the absence of an autopsy.” Furthermore, the summary expresslyexplains that Dr Cary was unable to categorically exclude the possibility of a gunshotwound because of the “limited X-ray material, the absence of a full post mortemexamination and CT scan.”
194. A number of officials from the Pakistani government at the time of theassassination and a number of police officials from the Punjab police have sought tocite the Scotland Yard report as support for, or ratification of, the Rawalpindi police’ssecurity arrangements for Ms Bhutto or its management of the crime scene on 27December 2007 and other actions or inactions of the Rawalpindi police andgovernment officials at that time. There is no factual or logical basis for suchassertions. The Scotland Yard team stated clearly that they were not reviewing thesecurity arrangements for Ms Bhutto and that identification of those responsible wasnot within the team’s terms of reference.
195. Given its extremely narrow mandate, much of the context in the Scotland Yardreport was – as Scotland Yard emphasized – taken on good faith from the Pakistanipolice. That good faith was, in many respects, abused by officers of the RawalpindiDistrict Police, particularly with respect to security arrangements. The Commission’sinquiry shows the accounts of the Rawalpindi police provided to Scotland Yard to belargely untrue.
196. At the request of the Commission, the Netherlands Forensic Institute (NFI)conducted a review of Scotland Yard’s investigation of the cause and manner of deathof Ms Bhutto. Based on its analysis of the Scotland Yard report, the NFI prepared itsown report for the Commission in which it concluded that there were no importantinconsistencies in Scotland Yard’s investigation.
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The further investigation: second JIT (FIA-led)
197. In October 2009, 18 months after the PPP government had come into power inPakistan, the Ministry of Interior initiated further investigations, for which a JIT wasformed, in order to investigate aspects of the case not covered by the first JIT. ThisJIT is federally led, with officers of the FIA/SIG leading the investigation, which iscurrently ongoing. The Commission will not comment in any detail on the work ofthis second JIT.
198. The Commission does note, generally, that this second JIT has been morerigorous in carrying out its investigations. The investigators have been vigorouslypushing certain areas of the investigation and appear to have made some furtherprogress. Nevertheless, it is unclear to what extent even this investigation will be freeto conduct an unfettered pursuit of the truth, including in freely investigating thosewho may have borne the greatest responsibility for the planning and execution of MsBhutto’s assassination.III. Threats, Responsibilities and Possible Culpabilities
199. A determination of criminal responsibility for planning, organizing, funding,supporting and carrying out the assassination can only be made by the competentauthorities of Pakistan. This Commission has neither the authority nor the means toreach such conclusions. Indeed, if it were to do so, it could jeopardize futureprosecutions or make it difficult for future accused persons to receive fair trials. Thissection, instead, assesses hypotheses regarding possible culpabilities of individualsand entities that appeared to pose threats to Ms Bhutto. In addition, this sectionreviews the performance of those who were responsible for Ms Bhutto’s security andthe investigation of her assassination. This section also reviews the role of Pakistan’sintelligence agencies in this case.A. Threats and Possible Culpabilities regarding the Assassination
200. The Commission’s inquiry has resulted in a picture of the significant threatsthat Ms Bhutto faced on her return to Pakistan. In her writings and speeches, and indiscussions with her colleagues as described to the Commission, Ms Bhutto wasoutspoken about her perception of the threats posed to her.
201. The conditions in Pakistan that resulted in threats to Ms Bhutto must beunderstood against the backdrop of Pakistan’s recent history. Under the militarydictatorship of General Zia ul Haq from 1977 to 1988, a once secular military wasaligned with political Islam, and jihad was used as a tool to recruit and supportinsurgents fighting against the Soviet-backed government in Afghanistan. ThePakistani military organized and supported the Taliban to take control of Afghanistanin 1996. Similar tactics were used in Kashmir against India after 1989. Thesepolicies resulted in active linkages between elements of the military and theEstablishment with radical Islamists, at the expense of national secular forces, and the
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entrenchment of religious extremist and other militant groups in the tribal areas andPunjab. Ms Bhutto’s return from exile in 2007 occurred against this backdrop. Therefore, a discussion of the threats to Ms Bhutto and of the forces that feltthreatened by her potential return to power in Pakistan must include the following:Al-Qaida, Taliban and local jihadi groups and elements of the Establishment.
Al-Qaida
202. The Musharraf Government and Ms Bhutto disagreed on much, but they bothidentified threats to her arising from Islamist extremist groups. Ms Bhutto hadconcerns that Al-Qaida might have reason to do her harm. Her public positionsagainst Al-Qaida-inspired Islamist violence, on the need to check extremism in thetribal areas, and on the perception among many that she was acting on behalf of theUnited States, are factors that could have made her a target for Al-Qaida and alliedgroups. She asserted in her 2007 book, Reconciliation, that Usama bin Laden fundedthe ISI’s attempt to oust her first government in 1989 through a no-confidence motionin parliament. A close associate remembered that during the election campaigning,Ms Bhutto told her, “Usama bin Laden would take out a lot of money to have mekilled.”
203. Al-Qaida posed a general threat to all Pakistani politicians, including MsBhutto, who were not in line with their thinking. But as her return to Pakistan neared,and as she vigorously campaigned for the election, the threat to her increased andbecame specific. The Al-Qaida threats to Ms Bhutto were relayed to her by thePakistan Government and United Arab Emirates authorities.
204. After the Karachi attack, on 23 October, senior PPP leader and Ms Bhutto’slawyer, Mr Farooq Naek, received a hand-written letter at his office from a personclaiming to be the “head of suicide bombers and a friend of Al-Qaida” andthreatening that Ms Bhutto would be assassinated in a gruesome manner. Mr Naeknotified the Supreme Court, urging that the threat be passed on to the governmentwith a request to strengthen Ms Bhutto’s security
. 205. Further indications of the Al-Qaida threat to Ms Bhutto emerged two days afterher death when Al-Qaida spokesman Mustafa Abu al Yazid claimed responsibility forher assassination in a telephone interview with Asia Times Online. He stated: “Wehave terminated the most precious American asset who vowed to defeat mujaheddin.” Al Yazid said that Al-Qaida had ordered the assassination, which was carried out byoperatives of Lashkar e Jangvi, a Punjab jihadi group with a strong anti-Shia bias. Al-Qaida stood to gain from the political destabilization of Pakistan that followed herassassination. Given the above, the Commission believes that the competentauthorities of Pakistan should vigorously pursue the possible role of Al-Qaida in MsBhutto’s assassination.
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The Pakistani Taliban and other local jihadi groups
206. The Pakistani Taliban is an agglomeration of Pashtun militant Islamist groupsoperating in the tribal areas. They are closely aligned with the Afghan Taliban, andwith Al-Qaida. Several of these groups banded together in late 2007 to form theTehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) under the leadership of Baitullah Mehsud, a Talibancommander from South Waziristan. Beginning initially as a support network for theAfghan Taliban and Al-Qaida in Pakistan’s tribal areas, the Pakistan Taliban becamean actor in its own right after General Musharraf was perceived to have sided with theUnited States’ anti-terror efforts. As a result, the Pakistani Taliban now constitutes asignificant threat to Pakistan’s internal stability.
207. The jihadi organizations are Sunni groups based largely in Punjab. Members ofthese groups aided the Taliban effort in Afghanistan at the behest of the ISI and latercultivated ties with Al-Qaida and Pakistani Taliban groups. The Pakistani militaryand ISI also used and supported some of these groups in the Kashmir insurgency after1989. The bulk of the anti-Indian activity was and still remains the work of groupssuch as Lashkar e Taiba, which has close ties with the ISI. A common characteristicof these jihadi groups was their adherence to the Deobandi Sunni sect of Islam, theirstrong anti-Shia bias, and their use by the Pakistani military and intelligence agenciesin Afghanistan and Kashmir.
208. Given this background, it is not surprising that they posed a threat to Ms Bhuttoand what she stood for. Ms Bhutto was not only a modernist politician and the leaderof a major secular party, she also spoke out strongly and publicly against theextremist Islam espoused by these groups. She was supportive of the United Statesapproach to terrorism, and it was open knowledge that the United Kingdom andUnited States were aiding in her return to Pakistan. And despite her differences withGeneral Musharraf, she had supported his crackdown on militants, including in theRed Mosque episode in July 2007. Indeed, she had repeatedly castigated GeneralMusharraf for doing a half-hearted job on the terror front. Many believe that MsBhutto’s gender was also an issue with the religious extremists who believed that awoman should not lead an Islamic country. She was perceived as a Shia, at least bysome militants, because her mother and husband are Shia.
209. Just before Ms Bhutto’s return to Pakistan in October 2007, a newspaper reportquoting Senator Saleh Shah Qureshi of South Waziristan, noted that BaitullahMehsud had threatened to welcome Ms Bhutto with a wave of suicide bombers. Thereport was emphatically denied by Senator Saleh Shah. However, several sources inPakistan have told the Commission that Baitullah Mehsud presented a credible threatto Ms Bhutto. Along these lines, two of Baitullah Mehsud’s aides, when escorting aBritish Broadcasting Corporation journalist in South Waziristan in early October9 The term jihadi is understood in Pakistan to denote those groups that fought against the Soviet Union inAfghanistan, and later carried out actions in Kashmir. Several of these groups and their splinters haveestablished links with Al-Qaida and the Afghan and Pakistani Taliban.
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2007, said that they were convinced that Ms Bhutto’s impending return to Pakistanwas part of a power-sharing deal with General Musharraf that was meant tostrengthen the already strong pro-Americanism of the Pakistani Government. “She isactually a Shia, so what else can we expect”, one of the aides told the journalist,according to the BBC report.
210. Pakistani Taliban leader Baitullah Mehsud was also blamed for theassassination by the government of General Musharraf in its 28 December 2007 pressconference. Former senior intelligence officials told the Commission that inNovember and December, they had been tracking multiple suicide bomb cells thattargeted Ms Bhutto in Larkana, Mardan, Peshawar and Rawalpindi. Senior officialsof the current Pakistani government have expressed their belief in Mr Mehsud’sinvolvement, although they continue to believe that he was part of a largerconspiracy.
211. Taliban and Al-Qaida culpability was also supported by Mr Michael Hayden,the Director of the United States Central Intelligence Agency. He alleged in aWashington Post interview on 18 January 2008 that Ms Bhutto was killed by fightersallied with Baitullah Mehsud with support from Al-Qaida’s terrorist network. TheUnited States Government did not permit the Commission to meet with United Statesintelligence officials to ascertain the basis for Mr Hayden’s assertion.
212. These factors alone are insufficient to gauge possible Taliban and jihadiculpability for Ms Bhutto’s assassination. Nevertheless, almost no one theCommission has interviewed, including Ms Bhutto’s PPP colleagues, deny that themilitants (Taliban and jihadi groups) posed a threat to Ms Bhutto. One retiredgeneral, quite critical of the Musharraf regime, admits: “Baitullah Meshud would beone of those who would have wanted [Ms Bhutto] killed.” The Commission believesthat the competent authorities of Pakistan should aggressively pursue the possible roleof the TTP and Pakistani jihadi groups in Ms Bhutto’s assassination.Threats from the Establishment
213. The Establishment is generally used in Pakistan to refer to those who exercisede facto power; it includes the military high command and the intelligence agencies,together with the top leadership of certain political parties, high-level members of thebureaucracy and business persons that work in alliance with them. The military highcommand and intelligence agencies form the core of the Establishment and are itsmost permanent and influential components.
214. Ms Bhutto, through her writings and public statements, was outspoken as to thesources of the threats she faced; key among these were elements of the Establishment,whose tactics and reach she knew well. She and many others held the military andthe intelligence agencies responsible for a number of “dirty” campaigns against herwhen she ran for office in the 1980s and 1990s, as well as for orchestrating thesacking of her governments. She believed that the policies she advocated – a return
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to civilian rule and democracy, human rights, negotiations with India, reconciliationwith the non-Muslim world, and confrontation with radical Islamists – threatened theEstablishment’s continued control of Pakistan.
215. Ms Bhutto’s relevant policy proposals, including those laid out in the PPP’sManifesto for 2007, called for restrictions on the power of the military andintelligence agencies. She proposed bringing them under civilian, democraticcontrols, with provisions for transparency and control of the military budget andspending. She vowed publicly to use reforms to rid the intelligence agencies ofelements driven by political or religious motives. Some of the positions taken by MsBhutto that touched Establishment concerns included:a. Her publicly stated position on the need to eliminate all remnants of themilitary-militant nexus. Her proposal was to eliminate the military andintelligence ties to the Taliban and jihadis, although many in thoseinstitutions still publicly regarded these groups as important foreign policytools to advance national interests against India in the sub-region. In thisvein, Ms Bhutto denounced the military’s various truces with Talibanmilitants in Swat and the tribal areas, arguing that they amounted toappeasement. b. Her independent position on the urgent need to improve relations withIndia, and its implications for the Kashmir dispute, which the military hadregarded as its policy domain. c. Her frequent denunciation of the role of the military and the intelligenceagencies in domestic politics.d. The perception of her willingness to accommodate Western concerns. While the military and others in the Establishment were willing tocooperate with the United States, United Kingdom and other Westernstates, Ms Bhutto was portrayed as overly pliant. e. Her alleged willingness to compromise Pakistan’s nuclear programme and allow greater Western access to it. The military has kept a tight grip on itsnuclear secrets and its persistent refusal to allow international access to DrA Q Khan, the Pakistani nuclear scientist who sold nuclear weaponsknowledge to other countries. Ms Bhutto had said that she would give theInternational Atomic Energy Agency access to Dr Khan, although herstatement was twisted in some media stories. 216. Many sources interviewed by the Commission believe that the Establishmentwas threatened by the possibility of Ms Bhutto’s return to high public office and thatit was involved in or bears some responsibility for her assassination. Their analysis isbased on years of observation and knowledge of how the Establishment works,although they do not offer any specific evidence with regard to the Bhuttoassassination.
217. Several of these sources spoke of the existence of elements within theEstablishment who saw her return to an active political life in Pakistan as a threat to
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their power. These elements included, in particular, those who retain links withradical Islamists, especially the militant jihadi and Taliban groups and aresympathetic to their cause or view them as strategic assets for asserting Pakistan’srole in the region. The development of these organizations and the spread of Islamistextremism, which marginalized secular democratizing forces, was promoted duringthe General Zia ul Haq military regime (which overthrew the civilian governmentheaded by Ms Bhutto’s father and later executed him); the ISI cultivated theserelationships, initially in the context of the Cold War and the anti-Soviet war inAfghanistan in the 1980’s and later in support of Kashmiri insurgents. While severalPakistani current and former intelligence officials told the Commission that theiragencies no longer had such ties in 2007, virtually all independent analysts providedinformation to the contrary and affirmed the ongoing nature of many such links.
218. Ms Bhutto’s own concerns about threats to her by Al-Qaida and other militantsresulted in part from her knowledge of their links with people who had worked withor been assets of the ISI. She feared that the authorities could activate theseconnections, using radical Islamists to harm her, while hiding their own role in anyattack. This was the basis for her allegations against Lt. General (ret) Hamid Gul andBrigadier (ret) Ejaz Shah, in her 16 October letter to General Musharraf. Gul wasDirector General of MI under Zia ul Haq and then Director General of the ISI whenMs Bhutto was Prime Minister in 1988-90. Although he was retired, Ms Bhuttobelieved he still maintained his former close ties with the militant jihadis. BrigadierEjaz Shah, Director General of the Intelligence Bureau in 2007 and a former ISIofficer, was a member of General Musharraf’s inner circle. When Omar SaeedSheikh¸ the main accused in the Daniel Pearl murder case, was cornered in 2002, herequested to surrender to Brigadier Shah. Some believe this was because of BrigadierShah’s reported intelligence connections with Mr Sheikh; Brigadier Shah vigorouslydenied this and told the Commission that the surrender was facilitated through familyties in their home community.
219. Militants of particular concern to Ms Bhutto and others included Qari SaifullahAkhtar, one of the founders of the extremist Harkat ul Jihad Islami (HuJI), whom sheaccused of involvement in a failed coup attempt against her in 1995, during hersecond government. Mr Akhtar, who was living in Pakistan when Ms Bhuttoreturned from exile, was reportedly one of the ISI’s main links to the Taliban regimein Afghanistan and is believed to have cultivated ties to Mr bin Laden, who lived inAfghanistan during that period. Ms Bhutto believed that Mr Akhtar was connected tothe Karachi attack against her in October 2007. Mr Akhtar’s one-time deputy IlyasKashmiri, who had ties with the Pakistani military during the Afghan and Kashmircampaigns, had been a senior aide to Mr bin Laden’s deputy Ayman al Zawahiri. 220. It was such links and connections between elements in the intelligence agenciesand militants, which most concerned Ms Bhutto and many others who believed thatthe authorities could activate these connections to harm her. Given their clandestinenature, any such connection in an attack on her is very difficult to detect or prove.
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221. Ms Bhutto also emerged as a potential threat for General Musharraf, as sheincreasingly challenged his plans to maintain his hold on power, first by returning toPakistan to campaign, then by focusing on the potential for election rigging, andfinally by campaigning directly against the military dictatorship during the weeks ofmartial law. Some believe that he became increasingly angry at Ms Bhutto forcriticizing him and his regime so strongly, after having engaged in negotiations withhim. Along the same lines, General Musharraf’s allies, the PML-Q were alsothreatened by Ms Bhutto, as they had the most to lose if the PPP were to win theelections and displace them from their majority position in Parliament.
222. Over the course of her campaign in Pakistan before her assassination, MsBhutto developed the view that General Musharraf was the main threat to her safety. As she saw it, his government was not providing the security she was warranted anddeserved due to the threats against her and her status as a former prime minister. Anemail she sent to her United States-based adviser, Mr Mark Siegel, stressed hersecurity concerns and stated: “I have been made to feel insecure by Musharraf and hisminions.”
223. The Commission believes that the criminal investigation of both attacks againstMs Bhutto, first in Karachi and in Rawalpindi when she was killed, must include afocus on those who may have been involved, not only on the direct operational level,but also in their conception, planning and financing. In this regard, the pertinentauthorities should follow all leads and explore all reasonable hypotheses in thisregard, including the possible involvement of those who form part of theEstablishment.Other hypotheses of culpability
224. The assassination of Ms Bhutto has led to a proliferation of hypothesesregarding possible perpetrators. These include other governments and Bhutto familymembers, close associates and security aides. The majority of these hypotheses donot assert any basis in evidence, with some seeking to do no more than name personsbelieved to have benefited in some way from Ms Bhutto’s death, including thoseclosest to her. The stubborn persistence of these hypotheses is attributable almostentirely to the abject failure of the government authorities at the time to carry out aninvestigation with vigour and integrity. The Commission need not address each ofthese many theories in turn. It is sufficient to note that the proper response is anunfettered criminal investigation – a meaningful search for truth – which has thus farbeen frustrated.
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B. ResponsibilitiesSecurity provided by the Pakistani authorities
225. The Pakistani Government failed in its responsibility to protect Ms Bhutto. Herstatus as a former prime minister and a leading political candidate and the existenceof credible threats on her life should have prompted an effective security response.
226. There was no overall federal security plan to safeguard Ms Bhutto. The federalnature of the organization of the Pakistani police made the establishment of auniformly high level security programme difficult, but this does not absolve thefederal Government of responsibility.
227. Provincial police did not receive from the Ministry of Interior securityinstructions for Ms Bhutto like those provided for the protection of other formerprime ministers. As a result, security provisions for her varied from election rally toelection rally depending on the capacity and motivation of the provincial and localpolice. In addition, the effectiveness of the police security plans relied to a greatextent on the supplemental security provided by the PPP. There was no overallsecurity plan to provide protection to Ms Bhutto between campaign events.
228. The provision of security equipment from the authorities for Ms Bhutto wasinadequate, and the equipment provided often did not work.
229. The Pakistani authorities identified threats to Ms Bhutto and urged her not toreturn to Pakistan. There is little evidence of efforts by the authorities to act againstthose threats. Given the seriousness of the threats identified by the Government andthe dangerous individuals and institutions presenting those threats, the federalresponse to the danger to Ms Bhutto was extremely inadequate. The federalauthorities took on no effective responsibility for her security, merely passing onthreat warnings to Ms Bhutto and provincial authorities, and agreeing to theappointment of Major Imtiaz as a liaison between the authorities and the PPP.
230. The appointment of Major Imtiaz as a liaison between the authorities and MsBhutto proved to be insufficient. There was little support for Major Imtiaz by thefederal or local authorities. Since he travelled with her most of the time, he was notable to work effectively with federal or local authorities to plan security arrangementsin advance or receive adequate information from them. Major Imtiaz’s appointmentgives the impression of federal support, but it was ineffectual.
231. At Liaquat Bagh, on 27 December 2007, security for Ms Bhutto by the Punjabpolice was ineffective, insufficient and passive. Her assassination could have beenprevented with proper security. The security plan was not adequate, and there is littleevidence that it was even implemented. The plan called for the deployment of 1,371police, but the Commission does not believe that the number of police actuallydeployed came close to that figure. The performance of the police demonstrated a
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lack of seriousness of purpose, a lack of leadership at the top and insufficientcommitment among the ranks.
232. On Ms Bhutto’s departure from the rally, the police did not control the crowdsoutside Liaquat Bagh and coming from within the park. As a result the crowd wasable to surround her vehicle thereby slowing it down. Video footage and photographsshow very little police presence at this time. The delay in the departure of Ms Bhuttofrom the scene is due to the crowds blocking her car. The Elite police unit that wassupposed to provide a “box” security for Ms Bhutto’s vehicle were not immediatelypresent to do so. The police had a responsibility to ensure that the departureproceeded quickly and smoothly, and that if the primary route was blocked, analternative route could be used. That the only alternative route was blocked byparked police cars is inexcusable. Their failure to clear Liaquat Road to allow for arapid departure from the rally was a critical failure.
233. There was no emergency plan in place in case of an attack. Once the attackoccurred, chaos ensued. Her vehicle was not accompanied by a police escort to gether to a hospital quickly. It is extraordinary that her vehicle was stuck alone onMurree Road until the arrival of Ms Sherry Rehman’s car which took her to thehospital. Save for the people in her vehicle, Ms Bhutto was alone, without policeescort or support from the back up armoured vehicle that was supposed to be part ofher convoy. 234. The inadequacy of the Rawalpindi District Police’s security arrangements forMs Bhutto is further underscored when compared to those of the Karachi police forMs Bhutto’s arrival there on 18 October 2007. The event of Ms Bhutto’s return toPakistan clearly had a higher profile than the Rawalpindi public gathering. However,that difference cannot account for the fundamental differences in the securityarrangements. Unlike the Rawalpindi District Police, the Karachi police engaged inan extensive series of meetings with the PPP to develop security arrangementscooperatively. The Karachi police also had a more coherent written security plan,which emphasized coordination with PPP security elements, and integrated them intothe plan. The seriousness of purpose with which the Karachi police made theirsecurity arrangements was also reflected in the concrete efforts they undertook to testthe efficacy of their security plan. These efforts included a full rehearsal of thesecurity plan on 17 October 2007, involving thousands of police officers.
Security provided by the PPP
235. The PPP was forced, by the nature of the threats to Ms Bhutto and a perceptionthat the authorities would not adequately protect her, to devise supplemental securityarrangements.
236. While the PPP did not bear responsibility for Ms Bhutto’s security, its ownprovision of security was characterized by disorganization and a lack ofprofessionalism. Each senior PPP official the Commission spoke with on this issue
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described the PPP security arrangements differently. Even though Mr Rehman Malikclaimed that he was not an adviser on physical security, the letters he wrote toauthorities, and his liaison role with security and intelligence agencies shows that hewas deeply involved in the overall management of Ms Bhutto’s security. Hisdeparture from the scene at Rawalpindi after the attack allowed her damaged vehicleto become isolated. The rapid departure of the only back up vehicle, in which MrMalik and other senior PPP leaders rode, was a serious security lapse. After movinga safe distance away from the scene of the attack, the occupants of the vehicle shouldhave waited to see for themselves if Ms Bhutto’s vehicle was able to depart safelyand if there was a need for a back up vehicle. As the back-up, their vehicle wouldhave been a necessary part of the convoy whether Ms Bhutto’s vehicle was damagedor not.
237. Major Imtiaz did not provide leadership after the attack, although he was assigned to the team precisely for this reason. It is understandable that others in thevehicle would be overwhelmed by the shock of the attack, but as the lead securityprofessional in the vehicle, he would have been expected to provide leadership at thatcritical moment.
The criminal investigations
238. There was not an effective or active criminal investigation of either the Karachior the Rawalpindi attacks. This is inexplicable in terms of the basic principles ofeffective police work and contrary to the legal responsibilities of the relevantauthorities.
239. There is no evidence that the Rawalpindi police made any attempt to seal thecrime scene in the aftermath of Ms Bhutto’s assassination despite the purported 1,371strong police deployment. The decision to use a fire hose on the crime scene withinone hour and forty minutes of the attack – allegedly because of civil unrest and inorder to prevent rioting – is not acceptable, and effectively destroyed evidence. Thisdestruction made it extremely difficult if not impossible to gather more DNAevidence than the minimal amount already gathered. This massive loss of evidencedid irreparable damage to the crime scene. Contrary to the 23 pieces of evidencegathered by the police, attacks of this type would typically result in the collection ofthousands of pieces of evidence.
240. The Commission is not convinced that the decision to wash the scene was madeby CPO Saud Aziz alone. The attack was too significant and the target of the attacktoo important to Pakistani society to make such a decision solely on his level. Sources told the Commission that CPO Saud Aziz was constantly talking on hismobile phone while at the hospital. In the Commission’s view, he has not adequatelyexplained who called him during that time. Other sources have provided credibleinformation about the intervention of intelligence agencies in the case. Whoever wasresponsible for this decision, and for whatever reason, acted in a manner that is
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contrary to the most basic police standards and hampered the proper investigation ofthe assassination. 241. The handling of other important items of evidence, most significantly thefailure to preserve the vehicle in which Ms Bhutto rode and other vehicles fortechnical examination prevented the gathering of important evidence.
242. The absence of an autopsy caused serious damage to the investigation. Thelack of a clear cause of death established by an autopsy severely affected thecredibility of the Government among the general public and has given rise to widespeculation as to the cause of Ms Bhutto’s death. CPO Saud Aziz again appears in asetting in which he seems to have been able to impede the effective investigation ofthe crime. Again, it is unlikely that a police officer of his level could make suchsignificant and ultimately destructive decisions on his own and wield such power. CPO Saud Aziz maintains that he did not deny any requests for an autopsy.
243. The Government press conference of 28 December 2007 – the day after theassassination and the day that the Joint Investigation Team was formed – prejudicedthe investigation and eroded public confidence. This problem is especially acutebecause Pakistan was led by a military government in a society in which the militaryhas significant and broad authority. The Commission concludes that the decision forthe press conference was made by General Musharraf.
244. The investigation of the JIT, apart from the first few days after the attack, wascharacterized by inaction.
245. After the early actions of the members of the JIT, particularly by the FederalInvestigation Agency members, the JIT relied almost exclusively on informationreceived from intelligence agencies without follow up police work. They did notengage in the most basic police procedures, such as interviewing the occupants of MsBhutto’s vehicle. Even if those persons and others within the PPP did not wish tocooperate with the authorities, the Pakistani police had the means to summonparticipation, and it is surprising that they did not, given the seriousness of the crime.
246. There has been essentially no communication between the Karachi policeofficials investigating the Karachi attack and the Rawalpindi police officials in theJIT investigating the assassination. The two police investigations remainunconnected, despite the need for full communication and cooperation in these linkedcomplex cases.
247. The Commission is concerned that its existence enabled the authoritiesresponsible for the investigation to slow their activities. For example, theGovernment, which has been in office since April 2008, only commenced the futherinvestigation in October 2009. The Commission’s effort to determine the facts andcircumstances of Ms Bhutto’s assassination is not a substitute for an effective, officialcriminal investigation. These activities should have been carried out simultaneously.
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Ms Bhutto was killed more than two years ago. A Government headed by her party,the PPP, has been in office for most of that time, and it only began the furtherinvestigation, a renewal of the stalled official investigation, in October 2009. This issurprising to the Commission.
Role of intelligence agencies10
248. A number of knowledgeable and credible persons with whom the Commissionspoke cited the pervasive reach, control and clandestine role of intelligence agenciesin Pakistani society. In the course of this inquiry, the Commission encounteredabundant confirmation of this not only in law enforcement matters, but also in variousaspects of the country’s political life during 2007.
249. Particularly noteworthy was the intense involvement of intelligence agencies incriminal investigations. While it is often necessary, especially in terrorism cases, forintelligence agencies to provide significant assistance to police investigativeauthorities, in the investigation of Ms Bhutto’s assassination, the role of intelligenceagencies far exceeded an assisting role, with the effect of subordinating lawenforcement institutions.
250. The agencies, and in particular the ISI, carried out parallel investigations intoboth the Karachi attack and the assassination in Rawalpindi. A former intelligenceofficial with direct knowledge of the matter told the Commission that the ISI hadconducted its own investigation of the Karachi attack and had successfully detainedfour men who provided logistical support for the attack. None of the police or othercivilian officials interviewed by the Commission regarding Karachi reported anyknowledge of such detentions. The same source told the Commission that ISI agentscovering Ms Bhutto’s meeting in Liaquat Bagh on 27 December were the first tosecure her vehicle and take photos of it after the attack there, among other actions. One very prominent and directly knowledgeable former government official informedthe Commission that the ISI was, in fact, responsible for the investigation of MsBhutto’s assassination. Others have asserted that the Intelligence Bureau had and stillhas a significant role in the investigation.
251. Members of the JIT that investigated Ms Bhutto’s assassination all but admittedthat virtually all of their most important information, including that which led to theidentification and arrest of those suspects now in prison, came from intelligenceagencies. The Commission is satisfied that this was the case given that there is little10Pakistan has three major intelligence agencies. The Intelligence Bureau (IB) is the main civilianintelligence agency and focuses on domestic intelligence; however it reports to the Prime Minister ratherthan the Minister of the Interior and has generally been led by a high-ranking military official. MilitaryIntelligence (MI), is the section of the Army specialized in intelligence and reports to the Chief of ArmyStaff. The Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) draws on the intelligence capacity of the three military servicebranches, in addition to its own more autonomous capacity; considered to be the pre-eminent agencyamong the three, nominally it reports to the Prime Minister, but generally its effective practice has been toreport to the Chief of Army Staff.
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indication that the JIT considered any other hypotheses, followed leads or developedits own evidence beyond the framework set by those agencies.
252. Several high-ranking law enforcement officials expressed concerns to theCommission that resources to build investigative capacity, especially in terrorismcases, have gone to the intelligence agencies, while police resources and capacity lag. Indeed, in the aftermath of the attempts on General Musharraf’s life, the capacity ofthe ISI was strengthened to allow it to engage more effectively in such investigations. This tendency has led to a distortion and imbalance in the functions of theseinstitutions and presents a challenge for the future in ensuring the democratic rule oflaw.
253. Given the historical and possibly continuing relationships between intelligenceagencies and some radical Islamist groups that engage in extremist violence, theagencies could be compromised in their investigations of crimes possibly carried outby such groups.254. Wiretapping can, of course, be a legitimate intelligence and law enforcementtool. Yet in its efforts to determine the provenance and authenticity of the phoneintercept used to implicate Baitullah Mehsud in the assassination of Ms Bhutto, theCommission received credible information regarding the systematic wire- tapping bythe ISI and the IB not only of suspected terrorists and other criminals, but also ofpoliticians, government officials, journalists and social activists. These activities arenot authorized or overseen by judicial authorities and are not in keeping with theoperations of such agencies in a democratic society.
255. Beyond their involvement in criminal investigations, the Commissionencountered a far-reaching presence of intelligence agencies in several key aspects ofthe tumultuous events of 2007, which formed in important part in shaping thecircumstances and context of Ms Bhutto’s return to Pakistan. This pervasivepresence at times called into question the ability of other institutions to exercise theirfull, independent mandate and functions.
256. The electoral process was one such area. The involvement of intelligenceagencies, and specifically the ISI, in influencing electoral outcomes in past electionsis well-documented and was confirmed to the Commission by a former seniorintelligence official. Ms Bhutto had her own concerns and reportedly asked GeneralMusharraf that ISI interference in the elections be curbed as part of guaranteeing freeand fair elections. The day after her July meeting in Abu Dhabi with GeneralMusharraf, an aide to Ms Bhutto was sent secretly to Islamabad on her behalf toreview the work of the firm hired to create the new electoral lists; his site visits forthis purpose were facilitated directly by General Kayani and other ISI staff. Theformer senior intelligence official also explained that in 2007 the ISI had guaranteedthat there would be no rigging. While by all accounts, the 2008 elections were “themost fair” in recent Pakistani history, constitutionally, the task of safeguarding theelectoral process is the role of the Pakistan Electoral Commission.
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257. The deep and direct involvement of the ISI, through its most senior leadership,in the political negotiations between General Musharraf and Ms Bhutto in all of itsstages and the role of all of the intelligence agencies in efforts to sack the Chief Justice and influence the composition of the Courts are additional examples of their central function.
258. This pervasive involvement of intelligence agencies in diverse spheres, which isan open secret, has undermined the rule of law, distorted civilian –military relationsand weakened some political and law enforcement institutions. At the same time, ithas contributed to wide-spread public distrust in those institutions and fed ageneralized political culture that thrives on competing conspiracy theories.
IV. Main Findings
259. The Commission has come to the following findings:i. After nine years in exile, former Prime Minister Mohtarma Benazir Bhuttoreturned to Pakistan on 18 October 2007, during an exceptionally violent year,marked by sharp increases in violence carried out both by Islamist extremistsand by the state. She returned in the context of a tenuous and inconclusivepolitical agreement with General Pervez Musharraf, as part of a processencouraged and facilitated by the governments of the United Kingdom and theUnited States. While their discussions included the issue of an eventualpower sharing arrangement, the final terms were never agreed. Indeed, theCommission received no compelling evidence that, by the time of herassassination, either Ms Bhutto or General Musharraf believed that she or hestill needed the support of the other to achieve their ultimate political goals.ii. Ms Bhutto was murdered on 27 December 2007 when a 15 and a halfyear-old suicide bomber detonated his explosives near her vehicle as she wasleaving the PPP event at Liaquat Bagh. No one believes that this boy actedalone. A range of government officials failed profoundly in their efforts firstto protect Ms Bhutto and second to investigate with vigour all thoseresponsible for her murder, not only in the execution of the attack, but also inits conception, planning and financing.iii. Responsibility for Ms Bhutto’s security on the day of her assassinationrested with the federal Government, the government of Punjab and theRawalpindi District Police. None of these entities took necessary measures torespond to the extraordinary, fresh and urgent security risks that they knewshe faced.iv. The federal Government under General Musharraf, although fully awareof, and tracking, the serious threats to Ms Bhutto’s security, did little morethan pass on those threats to her and provincial authorities and were not
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proactive in neutralizing them or ensuring that the security provided wascommensurate to the threats. The federal Government failed in its primaryresponsibility to provide effective protection to Ms Bhutto on her return toPakistan.v. The federal Government lacked a comprehensive security plan for MsBhutto, relying instead on provincial authorities, but then failed to issue tothem the necessary instructions. Particularly inexcusable was theGovernment’s failure to direct provincial authorities to provide Ms Bhutto thesame stringent and specific security measures it ordered on 22 October 2007for two other former prime ministers who belonged to the main political partysupporting General Musharraf. This discriminatory treatment is profoundlytroubling given the devastating attempt on her life only three days earlier andthe specific threats against her which were being tracked by the ISI.vi. Ms Bhutto’s assassination on 27 December 2007 could have beenprevented if the Rawalpindi District Police had taken adequate securitymeasures. The security arrangements for Ms Bhutto by the RawalpindiDistrict Police were ineffective and insufficient. The police’s security plan, aswritten, was flawed, containing insufficient focus on Ms Bhutto’s protectionand focusing instead on the deployment of police for crowd control purposes.In many respects, the security plan was not implemented. Although the plancalled for deploying 1,371 police officers, the actual deployment did notapproach that number. Among other failings: the police co-ordinated poorlywith the PPP’s own security; police escort units did not protect Ms Bhutto’svehicle as tasked; parked police vehicles blocked the emergency route; and,the police took grossly inadequate steps to clear the crowd so that Ms Bhutto’svehicle would have safe passage on leaving Liaquat Bagh. The performanceof individual police officers and police leadership was poor in areas offorward planning, accountability and command and control.vii. The additional security arrangements of the PPP lacked leadership andwere inadequate and poorly executed. The Commission recognizes theheroism of individual PPP supporters, many of whom sacrificed themselves toprotect Ms Bhutto. However, Ms Bhutto was left vulnerable in a severelydamaged vehicle that was unable to transport her to the hospital by theirresponsible and hasty departure of the bullet-proof Mercedes-Benz which, asthe back-up vehicle, was an essential part of her convoy.viii. The Rawalpindi District Police’s actions and omissions in the immediateaftermath of the assassination of Ms Bhutto, including the hosing down of thecrime scene and failure to collect and preserve evidence, inflicted irreparabledamage to the investigation. The collection of 23 pieces of evidence wasmanifestly inadequate in a case that should have resulted in thousands. Theone instance in which the authorities reviewed these actions, the Punjabcommittee of inquiry into the hosing down of the crime scene was a
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whitewash. Hosing down the crime scene so soon after the blast goes beyondmere incompetence; it is up to the relevant authorities to determine whetherthis amounts to criminal responsibility. Furthermore, CPO Saud Azizimpeded some Joint Investigation Team investigators from conducting on-siteinvestigations until two full days after the assassination. The failure ofprovincial authorities to otherwise review effectively the gross failures of thesenior Rawalpindi police officials and deal with them appropriatelyconstitutes a broader whitewash by Punjab officials.ix. The deliberate prevention by CPO Saud Aziz of a post mortemexamination of Ms Bhutto hindered a definitive determination of the cause ofher death. It was patently unrealistic for the CPO to expect that Mr Zardariwould allow an autopsy on his arrival in Pakistan at Chaklala Airbase nearlyseven hours after his wife’s death and after her remains had been placed in acoffin and brought to the airport. The autopsy should have been carried out atRawalpindi General Hospital long before Mr Zardari arrived.x. The Commission is persuaded that the Rawalpindi police chief, CPO SaudAziz, did not act independently of higher authorities, either in the decision tohose down the crime scene or to impede the post-mortem examination.xi. The Government press conference conducted by Brigadier Cheema on 28December 2007, the day after the assassination, was ordered by GeneralMusharraf. The Government’s assertion that Ms Bhutto’s death was causedwhen she hit her head on the lever of her vehicle’s escape hatch and thatBaitullah Mehsud and Al-Qaida were responsible for the suicide bomber weremade well before any proper investigation had been initiated. This action pre-empted, prejudiced and hindered the subsequent investigation.xii. An unequivocal determination as to the cause and means of Ms Bhutto’sdeath would have required an autopsy. The Commission has uncovered nonew evidence to suggest a gunshot injury to Ms Bhutto. Instead, a senior PPPofficial who publicly purported soon after the assassination to have seenindications of a bullet injury admitted to the Commission that she did not havedirect knowledge of such an injury.xiii. Ms Bhutto faced serious threats in Pakistan from a number of sources;these included Al-Qaida, the Taliban and local jihadi groups, and potentiallyfrom elements in the Pakistani Establishment. Notwithstanding these threats,the investigation into her assassination focused on pursuing lower leveloperatives allegedly linked to Baitullah Mehsud. The Commission finds itdisturbing that little was done to investigate Baitullah Mehsud himself, Al-Qaida and any individuals or organizations that might have worked on,supported or otherwise been involved directly or indirectly in the planning orexecution of the assassination. Investigators also dismissed the possibility ofinvolvement by elements of the Establishment, including the three persons
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identified by Ms Bhutto as threats to her in her 16 October 2007 letter toGeneral Musharraf.xiv. The Commission has identified other significant flaws in the JointInvestigation Team investigation led by the Punjab Additional InspectorGeneral Abdul Majeed. It lacked direction, was ineffective and suffered froma lack of commitment to identify and bring all of the perpetrators to justice. This delay further hampered the gathering of evidence. Despite indicationsthat there are links between the Karachi and Rawalpindi attacks, there hasessentially been no communication between the investigators on those twocases.xv. The investigation was severely hampered by intelligence agencies andother government officials, which impeded an unfettered search for the truth. Despite their explanation to the Commission that they do not have a mandateto conduct criminal investigations, intelligence agencies including the Inter-Services Intelligence agency (ISI) were present during key points in the policeinvestigation, including the gathering of evidence at the crime scene and theforensic examination of Ms Bhutto’s vehicle, playing a role that the policewere reluctant to reveal to the Commission.xvi. More significantly, the ISI conducted parallel investigations, gatheringevidence and detaining suspects. Evidence gathered from such parallelinvestigations was selectively shared with the police. What little directionpolice investigators had was provided to them by the intelligence agencies. However, the bulk of the information was not shared with police investigators. In fact, investigators on both the Karachi and Rawalpindi cases were unawareof information the ISI possessed about terrorist cells targeting Ms Bhutto andwere unaware that the ISI had detained four persons in late October 2007 forthe Karachi attack.xvii. More broadly, no aspect of the Commission’s inquiry was untouched bycredible assertions of politicized and clandestine action by the intelligenceservices – the ISI, Military Intelligence, and the Intelligence Bureau. Onvirtually every issue the Commission addressed, intelligence agencies playeda pervasive role, including a central involvement in the political negotiationsregarding Ms Bhutto’s return to Pakistan and the conduct of the elections.xviii. The Commission believes that the failures of the police and other officialsto react effectively to Ms Bhutto’s assassination were, in most cases,deliberate. In other cases, the failures were driven by uncertainty in the mindsof many officials as to the extent of the involvement of intelligence agencies. These officials, in part fearing involvement by the intelligence agencies, wereunsure of how vigorously they ought to pursue actions that they knew, asprofessionals, they should have taken.
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Concluding Remarks
260. It is essential that the perpetrators of the assassination of Benazir Bhutto bebrought to justice. The Pakistani authorities should ensure that the furtherinvestigation into the assassination of Ms Bhutto is fully empowered and resourcedand is conducted expeditiously and comprehensively, at all levels, without hindrance.
261. The Commission found that the performance of the Pakistani police wasseverely inadequate to the task of investigating the assassination of Ms Bhutto andlacking in independence and the political will to find the truth, wherever it may lead. The Pakistani authorities should consider conducting an independent review thatwould fix responsibilities and make those individuals found seriously wantingaccountable for their actions or inactions.
262. The Commission found that security arrangements for Ms Bhutto were fatallyin sufficient and ineffective. In this regard, as well, the Pakistani authorities shouldconsider conducting an independent review to determine responsibilities and holdaccountable those individuals who seriously failed in their duties. In addition, theGovernment of Pakistan may wish to consider a review of its security arrangementsfor all persons who require the highest level of security and consider measures toassign responsibility, with accountability, to an office at the federal level that wouldwork with local police to implement the standing order and standard operatingprocedures.
263. In light of the deeply flawed performance and conduct of many of the policeofficials involved in the events addressed in this report, the Commission believes itwould be appropriate for the Government of Pakistan to consider undertaking policereform measures consistent with the principles of democratic policing and operatingin a structure of accountability for protecting the rights of the individual, as set out inthe Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
264. Pakistan, like any other state, needs strong and effective intelligence agencies. However, the autonomy, pervasive reach and clandestine role of intelligence agenciesin Pakistani life underlie many of the problems, omissions and commissions set out inthis report. The actions of politicized intelligence agencies undermine democraticgovernance. Beyond the recent steps that have reportedly been taken to curb theinvolvement of intelligence agencies in political matters, the democratic rule of law inPakistan could be greatly strengthened with a thorough review of intelligenceagencies based on international best practices in this area.
265. The assassination of Benazir Bhutto occurred against the backdrop of a historyof political violence that was carried out with impunity. To address this issue,Pakistan should consider establishing a transitory, fully independent Truth andReconciliation Commission to investigate political killings, disappearances andterrorism in recent years and to provide victims of political assassinations andterrorism material and moral reparations. The United Nations principles for the